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ABSTRACT 
 
Security Analysis and Improvement Model for Web-based Applications.  
(December 2008) 
Yong Wang, B.S.; M.S., Anhui Agricultural University, China; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. William M. Lively 
                                                        Dr. Dick B. Simmons 
 
 
Today the web has become a major conduit for information. As the World Wide 
Web’s popularity continues to increase, information security on the web has become an 
increasing concern. Web information security is related to availability, confidentiality, 
and data integrity. According to the reports from http://www.securityfocus.com in May 
2006, operating systems account for 9% vulnerability, web-based software systems 
account for 61% vulnerability, and other applications account for 30% vulnerability.  
In this dissertation, I present a security analysis model using the Markov Process 
Model. Risk analysis is conducted using fuzzy logic method and information entropy 
theory. In a web-based application system, security risk is most related to the current 
states in software systems and hardware systems, and independent of web application 
system states in the past. Therefore, the web-based applications can be approximately 
modeled by the Markov Process Model. The web-based applications can be conceptually 
expressed in the discrete states of (web_client_good; web_server_good, 
web_server_vulnerable, web_server_attacked, web_server_security_failed; 
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database_server_good, database_server_vulnerable, database_server_attacked, 
database_server_security_failed) as state space in the Markov Chain. The vulnerable 
behavior and system response in the web-based applications are analyzed in this 
dissertation. The analyses focus on functional availability-related aspects: the probability 
of reaching a particular security failed state and the mean time to the security failure of a 
system. Vulnerability risk index is classified in three levels as an indicator of the level of 
security (low level, high level, and failed level). An illustrative application example is 
provided. As the second objective of this dissertation, I propose a security improvement 
model for the web-based applications using the GeoIP services in the formal methods. In 
the security improvement model, web access is authenticated in role-based access control 
using user logins, remote IP addresses, and physical locations as subject credentials to 
combine with the requested objects and privilege modes. Access control algorithms are 
developed for subjects, objects, and access privileges. A secure implementation 
architecture is presented. In summary, the dissertation has developed security analysis 
and improvement model for the web-based application. Future work will address Markov 
Process Model validation when security data collection becomes easy. Security 
improvement model will be evaluated in performance aspect.   
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Scope of the Work 
In the mid 1990s, the Web appeared to be a new medium for information 
dispersal. Universities use the Web to post university news. Faculties use the Web to 
deliver their lecture materials and homework assignments. Communities use the Web to 
introduce their community initiatives, development, safety, and rules [96]. Commercial 
companies use the Web to advertise their products, provide technical support, and sell 
their products. Soon, banks, hospitals, real-estates, and other areas were developing their 
web-based applications. The web-based applications have open access characteristics 
through the Internet connections.  
Today, the Web has been a major channel through which information is delivered. 
As the World Wide Web becomes ubiquitous, web software quality and information 
security receives more attention. Web quality is related to user satisfaction, while web 
information security is related to privacy, confidentiality, and data integrity. The web 
adapts the basic client/server model using HTTP (Hyper-text Transport Protocol) and 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) protocols to request and deliver information across 
computer networks [14]. 
 For software quality, different failure prediction models have been proposed [88].   
_______________ 
This dissertation comforms to the style and format of IEEE Transactions on Dependable 
and Secure Computing. 
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The models include experienced models and regression models [15], [18], [100]. By 
2001, more than 75 reliability growth models had been developed to predict software 
failures [5]. To some degree, software failure prediction models are already well studied. 
In a web application system, the typical client-server communication is adopted in 
a distributed manner, but in distributed software systems, the systems determine the 
security measurements. Thus, the information technology has changed its approach from 
a network-security to a software application-oriented security [4], [23]. Once the 
application port is open to the outside, the firewall for traffic control loses its function. 
Based on the website http://www.securityfocus.com in May 2006, operating systems, 
web-based applications, and others contribute 9%, 61% and 30% vulnerability 
respectively. 
For the web-based applications, two key aspects control web system security. The 
first method is access control. Through access to the Internet, attackers can post a high 
potential threat to the system. The second approach is the secure exchange of 
information. Access control preserves web information for proper usage. Secure 
exchange of information can keep information as original and confidential [42], [96]. 
Electronic entrance examination can play an important role in access control.  
Dowd et al. (2007) assigned software vulnerabilities into three categories [27], 
[97]: design vulnerabilities, implementation vulnerabilities, and operational 
vulnerabilities. The design vulnerability primarily comes from an aspect of software 
design. Implementation vulnerability comes from software code phase. Operational 
vulnerability originates from the operational procedures and configurations of software in 
specific environments.  
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According to Shah (2006) [84], the web vulnerabilities primarily come from 
program source codes. Previous investigation indicates that the vulnerability from source 
code errors accounts for 64%, while configurations account for 36% of the 
vulnerabilities. Shah further reported that, according to findings in IBM research labs, 
every 1500 lines of web program carry more than one vulnerability. 
Many trials have attempted to reduce vulnerabilities. A source code review can 
reduce the application vulnerability. During the code review, both external and internal 
reviews need to be conducted. Several security issues need to be addressed during the 
review: dependency, entry point exploration, vulnerability detection, and mitigations.  
Dependency: Before an examination, we are required to know the structures of 
the programs. The goal of this phase is to analyze the programming dependencies. In 
general, the web-based applications have a database server in the backend (MS SQL, 
Oracle, or MySQL). When conducting a code review, we need to check the system 
interface. We also examine the computational platform and the type of web server in the 
software system. This can help us to establish a secure system. Analyses of the web-
based application systems also help us to identify design patterns in the program. During 
the code reviews, we also need to check any integrated components from another party. 
Entry point exploration: The entry points give input to applications. These inputs 
are delivered to the database server, web server, and other components. When these 
parameters are not correct, they create possible system vulnerabilities. The entry points 
include HTTP variables, SOAP (simple object access protocol) messages, XML files, and 
mail systems. HTTP variables from the web browser and end users are delivered to 
applications. The entry points may appear to be forms and retrieval parameters. SOAP 
                                                                                                                                                             4
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
messages are also one kind of the important entry points in the web application systems. 
XML files used in the web-based applications may come from other resources. The web-
based application systems may receive mails carrying vulnerable entry points in the 
programs.  
Vulnerability detection: Detecting vulnerable entry points makes the threat 
analysis easy from its corresponding vulnerability. From the entry point, we can track the 
parameters’ path in the program and how the results are attributed to the parameters. 
From the vulnerability detection process, we also can assess the severity of the 
vulnerability.  
Mitigation: When having detected security weak points in a program, we can 
reduce the threat impact from the vulnerability. Thus, we can mitigate the frequency of 
vulnerability occurrence and the severity of potential damage from the vulnerability. For 
instance, we can add a rule to remove SQL server input with quote markers. In this way, 
we can reduce the chance of attacks in SQL injection. 
 To measure information security and define information security systems, several 
methods have been proposed. One of the popular methods in information security 
analysis is Markov Process Model. The Markov Process Model has been applied in 
process decisions in various domains. It has been used to analyze computer intrusion and 
detection data. Formal methods have been used to specify security-critical software 
systems [50]. Formal methods appear to be effective in the security system specifications. 
To effectively specify information security systems, we need to incorporate new 
technology into the application domain. 
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As the Internet technology keeps progressing, computer access can be easily 
traced to their physical locations using the GeoIP services [64]. The GeoIP services easily 
map the Internet IP address and its corresponding geographical location. The GeoIP 
services have been used in identifying attacker locations in network forensics [19], [24]. 
The GeoIP services can be used as a new way to authenticate a remote access computer 
in addition to user login.  
In this dissertation, I plan to present a security analysis model using the Markov 
Process Model. Risk analysis for vulnerabilities is conducted using a fuzzy logic 
approach and information entropy theory. The Markov Process Model has “memoryless” 
characteristics. In particular, the Markov Process Model has the property that the future 
does not rely on the past if we know the current [26], [80]. In a web-based application 
system, security is most related to the current software systems and hardware systems. 
Security is independent of the web-based application system states in the past if we know 
the current system states; in other words, the system security is directly decided by 
current software systems and hardware systems.  
Both system security and system risk for web software systems are the focus of 
this dissertation. For instance, if a computer virus gets into the web-based application 
systems, the virus must find some vulnerable points in the current software, hardware 
systems, or network configurations to spread it. Thus, current system state has a major 
impact on the system security in the future. System security has a kind of “memoryless” 
nature which the Markov Process Model owns. On the other hand, previous researchers 
have also validated that web access traffic has the Markov Chain Model property and can 
be modeled accordingly [51], [101]. Since web security is highly correlated with web 
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access traffic, security parameter in the systems appears to have a similar pattern to 
access traffic over time. The more access to web applications, the more security risks to 
the web-based application systems. Therefore, security risk in the web-based applications 
can be approximately modeled by the Markov Process Model.  
Maden et. al. (2002) developed a generic state transition model for intrusion 
tolerant systems in the Markov Chain Model [55]. I will extend the generic state model to 
the web-based applications. The extended model can describe multiple subsystems and 
the interactions among the subsystems in the web-based applications. In this dissertation, 
security risk in the web-based applications can be expressed in the states of 
(web_client_good, web_client_vulnerable, web_client_attacked, 
web_client_security_failed; web_server_good, web_server_vulnerable, 
web_server_attacked, web_server_security_failed; database_server_good, 
database_server_vulnerable, database_server_attacked, and 
database_server_security_failed) as possible state space in the Markov Chain Model. The 
vulnerable behavior and system response will be analyzed, and the analyses will focus on 
availability-related aspects: the probability of the modeled system moving to a particular 
security failed state and the mean time to a security failure of a system (when we do these 
analyses, we need to set security failure state as an absorbing state). Vulnerability risk 
index will be classified in three levels as an indicator of the level of security (low risk 
level, high risk level, and failed risk level). Empirical application examples in security 
analysis will be provided using web attack data from http://www.honeynet.org/scans; 
vulnerability risk analysis will be conducted using the vulnerability report data from 
https://cirdb.cerias.purdue.edu/coopvdb/public.  
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As the second objective of this dissertation, I plan to propose a security 
improvement model for the web-based applications using the GeoIP services in the 
formal methods. In the security improvement model, web access will be authorized in 
role-based access control using user login, remote IP address, and physical location as 
subject credentials. If the subject credential is satisfied, a further authentication check is 
conducted using the requested objects and privilege modes. Access control algorithms are 
developed late in the dissertation. A secure implementation architecture will be 
presented. Ren and Jin (2005) used IP address and its location to combine with TTL, 
MAC, and TCP/IP stack fingerprint to prevent IP spoofing attacks in network security 
[77]. American Express uses the GeoIP services for online fraud detection for credit card 
access [65]. More recently, British Columbia Lottery Corporation chose the GeoIP 
services for territory-based web access control. My approach is to develop a general 
model for the web-based application access using flexible role-based access control and 
the GeoIP services. This dissertation is intended to contribute to the literatures regarding 
these popularly discussed topics: the security analysis, risk analysis, and security 
improvement models for the web-based applications. 
 
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is organized by topic. In Chapter II, a literature review 
for security analysis and improvement is presented. This chapter summarizes the work 
done on security analysis, risk analysis for the web-based software systems, and security 
improvement model. Chapter III overviews the research and describes the security 
analysis, risk analysis, and security improvement model for the web-based applications. 
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Chapter IV describes the major methods used in the security analysis, risk analysis, and 
security improvement models. Chapter V analyzes the security analysis and risk 
assessment for the web-based applications. A case study example is provided. Chapter VI 
presents a security improvement model. Chapter VII concludes the dissertation by 
summarizing the research and its results. Cited references, two appendices, and a letter of 
permissions follow the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
SURVEY OF RELATED WORK 
  
Computer security has become an important research topic in computer science. 
In this research area, computer security has developed its own assumptions and 
languages, attracting many researchers from a variety of disciplines. [67]. Previous work 
in computer security concentrated on complex protocols, whereas recent research in 
security is extended to a system-level. This research studies how secure systems are 
designed in response to possible attacks, and current work focuses on intrusion tolerance 
so that designed systems can continually implement the designated functions when 
encountering successful attacks. Previous popular technologies in the Internet in gopher, 
FTP, and telnet are out of date and have been replaced by web technologies such as RSS, 
Ajax, and Soap. The RSS is a XML-based word to describe news and other web contents 
for publications. It describes one of three standards: RDF (resource description 
framework) Site Summary, Rich Site Summary, and Really Simple Syndication [4], [92]. 
AJAX is an Asynchronous JavaScript and XML tool to build different applications for 
the Web to handle user requests. SOAP  stands for Simple Object Access Protocol, a 
protocol that enables a program running in one operating system (i.e. windows) to talk 
with other programs running in the same or different environments (i.e. Linux) using 
HTTP and XML. As concurrently shifting in technology, the most attacks on computer 
networks ten years ago are now targeting the different applications and software systems 
on the computer. Software application-oriented security has become the focus of the 
research previously interested in  network-based security [4], [23], [97]. 
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A system-level model does not exist to measure security by a specific approach. 
Most trials are attempting to develop a security system process. To validate system 
security, the formal methods and red team approach are widely applied to different 
application systems [48], [53]. Both are very helpful for detecting and classifying system 
vulnerabilities. The main limitation may appear when applied to a large system [67]. 
 Recently, many researchers try to describe the system security numerically. 
Modeling is a good tool applied in evaluating systems that are either secure or not. 
Computer system failures from attacks display some similar characteristics to random 
system failures. Therefore, the evaluation method in system dependability can be applied 
to the system security. In general dependability analysis, failures are assumed to come 
from random events in the hardware or software. In security analysis, security failures 
depend on the system state and the time in which attackers are on the system. These 
security failure processes appear to be in a stochastic process [97]. 
Reliability describes a system in service rate during a specified time period. 
Reliability is determined by the frequency and severity of faults in computer systems. For 
security measurement, using probability of attacks can help impact analysis on system 
reliability [39], [87]. Developing and validating stochastic models in cyber attacks is still 
an open question in the research arena of computer science [68]. 
Availability can be defined as the portion of time that a system can conduct its 
intended function in the routine operation. When we analyze the impact of security on 
availability, system availability in the web-based applications after cyber attacks can be 
changed in different ways. It can be changed by an attack behavior on the system and by 
the time needed for security analysts to investigate an attack. It can be changed by the 
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effort to bring the system back to a good state after an attack. Availability in security 
specifically means that a system can provide its intended service after a successful attack 
[97].  
Safety indicates that a system can survive after serious damage. Since system 
safety relies on the impact of a system failure, we can define system safety similar to the 
dependability after attacks. When conducting security analysis, we can count the 
sensitive data as a part of safety. For instance, sensitive data open to the public can lead 
to severe damage for a security-sensitive system. The release of sensitive data will cause 
the severe safety concerns for a reliable system [68]. 
Performability describes system characteristics with an existing failure. In the 
analysis, a group of states for a system are specified. Each state matches to a system 
configuration, thus representing a specific system behavior.  Each state also describes 
how the analyzed system transits. Performance is associated with the costs and rewards in 
the system design [16], [59], [68]. One of the popular measurements for the 
performability is using mathematical model approaches to analyze the system behavior.  
Security covers the attributes we described before. Security also includes data 
integrity and confidentiality. Data integrity means that systems prevent the data from 
being revised in unauthorized ways while data confidentiality means that data are only 
accessed by the authorized users. Models for security analysis may include how and 
when the system security fails, the security failure consequences on the existing systems, 
expenses of system recovery, and costs of improving system defense [68]. 
As e-commerce becomes pervasive, security and privacy play more important 
roles than ever before. Computer security has spread beyond the technical arena; it affects 
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our daily life. Computer security appears to be a popular topic. The discussed topics 
mostly cover basic concepts: why we need a firewall to improve the security, what the 
encryption can do, and which security product is more useful [95]. Lake (2000) addressed 
the security problems [47]. He reported that there were about 20 new vulnerabilities 
reported every week from early 1998 to late 2000. Some vulnerabilities were found in 
open source software systems, while others were found in home-grown programs. Further 
analysis indicated the vulnerabilities in both Unix and Windows programs are well 
distributed in the collected data.  
The results of security failures are various. Security failures can lead to all the 
system being unavailable. Attack on a service system is a direct cause for a security 
failure. Attacks may come from either remote or local machines to their targets. In a 
remote attack, an attacker can get into a computer that is on the network, making good 
use of software flaws. When the software is authorized through a firewall in an open port, 
the firewall becomes functionless. The remote attacker can then exploit vulnerable 
computers unlimitedly. In a local attack, the intruders try to obtain a higher privilege, i.e. 
root right, on other computers. Most of the security weak points are discovered in 
operating systems and different applications [95]. It is always good practice for 
organizations to keep patching and updating the software when security vulnerabilities 
are reported. Several popular websites contain a lot of vulnerability information. Of them, 
Bugtraq, CERT advisories, and RISKS Digest are good resources to provide helpful 
information. 
Bugtraq: The Bugtraq uses an email discussion format to post security issues. The 
website is managed by www.securityfocus.com. A lot of security vulnerabilities were 
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first reported in the mailing list. The topics in the mailing list cover new security issues 
and host technical discussions for the solutions. Information from Bugtraq is relatively 
reliable and cited by many professional people. The Bugtraq often fully uncovers security 
vulnerabilities to the public, thus gives some pressures for vendors to fix the problems 
more quickly. The Bugtraq plays an important role in the computer security community. 
CERT Advisories (www.cert.org): The CERT is an information center for the 
Internet security. It is hosted by the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon 
University, and the research is funded by US federal government. Research concentrates 
on Internet vulnerabilities, support incident responses, and deliver security warnings.  
The CERT tends to provide services for important security problems and does not pay too 
much attention to low-level malicious activity.  Some people are not satisfied with the 
slow response from the CERT, however. The delay in the past was attributed to the 
policy that attack incidents were not allowed to report without the patches being ready to 
deliver. If the CERT handles the incident, it provides the important information for risk 
management and continues to play an important role in handling major vulnerabilities. 
Risk Digest: The Risk Digest uses a mailing list to deliver security related 
information. Risk Digest is managed by Peter Neumann. The mailing list discusses all 
topics regarding security, safety, and reliability. Risk Digest has a good connection with 
research community, and it is one of the first resources to report complicated attacks 
found by that community. A lot of Java security problems are first reported there. 
Interested users can subscribe the mailing list by sending an email to risks-
request@csl.sri.com. 
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Technical trends and software security:  Complex and large systems, compared to 
smaller systems, can carry flawed codes more easily. Their inherited complexity easily 
hides malicious codes in subsystems, due to detection and debugging difficulties. The 
flawed codes are a root cause for most of the vulnerabilities, and configuration errors 
account for other vulnerabilities. Extensible systems and programs are easy to introduce 
new vulnerabilities when the systems are extended. One of the biggest challenges 
nowadays is that the Internet is everywhere.  
The quickly expanded Internet has increased the number of attack paths. The 
Internet not only makes local attacks easier, but also makes remote attacks possible. For 
example, if a computer runs Windows NT systems, the Windows NT has 35 million lines 
of source codes. The Windows NT systems can carry flawed codes and functional 
modules. The good function of a computer depends on proper kernel functions and its 
application functions. With multiple flawed codes, it is possible for an attacker to use 
them to get into the computer and control the computer operations.  
The third challenge for software systems is that current software systems are 
easily extendable. For instance, a web browser plug-in is easy to install a new extension. 
Normally, we believe that the browser can manage security for the system. Practically, it 
is difficult to determine how a browser can have security operations, and it is hard to 
prevent malicious codes from getting into the extension codes. Analyzing an extensible 
system is much more challenging than analysis of a regular software system. Therefore, 
three challenges - pervasive Internet connections, increasing system complexity, and 
software extendability - make software security more important than ever [83], [95], [97].  
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How then can we define security? Different people have different concepts for 
security, or it can have different meanings for the same person. In my dissertation, 
security means that a policy can manage computer resource access and allocation. I 
define policy as the idea that different people have different access privileges. The 
computer systems have specified responses to each access request. For instance, if some 
users conduct a denial-of-service for the web-based applications, then, they are against 
the security policy of our computer system resources.  Without the explicitly defined 
policy, it is difficult to define any kind of the security in computer systems [27], [71], 
[95].  
Security goals:  Software security has several goals. These include prevention, 
traceability, monitoring, privacy and confidentiality, multilevel security, anonymity, 
authentication, and integrity [97]. 
Prevention: The Internet not only improves the software development 
productivity because of communication efficiency, but it also helps to spread attacks. 
When a vulnerability is found by attackers, the attackers can disperse their attacks over 
the Internet. The attackers may use one script to hack multiple websites. Internet-based 
attacks on software systems are one of the most serious attacks. These attacks must be 
counted in the risk management matrix of the software project. In the software lifecycle, 
rigorous program code reviews are strongly encouraged to reduce potential vulnerabilities 
in different phases. 
Traceability: A computer is difficult to operate at 100% security. The keys to 
restoring systems after attacks are to figure out when and how the attack happens. 
Auditing is not closely related to prevention approach; however, auditing may reduce 
                                                                                                                                                             16
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
potential attacks to some degree. Auditing has been well applied to accounting, banking, 
and other financial areas. From the learning in these areas, we know auditing can help 
computer security professionals to detect and reduce potential attacks in the information 
systems. Ye et. al. (2001) developed a probability model for intrusion detection using 
audit data [103]. The results indicated that the audit data can identify the critical property 
for the intrusion detection. Multiple audit events are required to provide sufficient 
statistics for the intrusion detection.  
Monitoring: It is a basic form of intrusion and detection technique. An easy way 
of monitoring is to check the known signatures, traffic patterns, and low-level system 
calls to detect the attacks in a real-time manner. Real-time intrusion detection can reduce 
potential damage. For example, tripwires can detect an attack in a real-time manner and 
may mitigate the severe attacks in a computer system.  
Privacy and confidentiality: Privacy and confidentiality are very important for all 
the applications in different domain areas (i.e. business, individuals). Business companies 
must keep their commercial secrets from their competitors. Individual web users want to 
protect digital activities from exposing to others. Software is designed to run on 
computers to implement some specific functions. A running program on the computer 
may have access to other sensitive data in the same computer, and thus may cause 
potential security breaches.  
Multilevel security: Government agencies normally have different levels of 
information security, specifying from open access to only for official use through 
unclassified to top secret level. Some companies also have different information security 
levels for different kinds of their employees. Multilevel security is one of the most 
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important approaches for information access control. For example, multilevel information 
security in a military battle field is extremely important.  
Anonymity: Anonymity is an important aspect of software security. Anonymous 
actions are very useful in preventing information exposure, but sometimes, anonymous 
actions are not allowed. All the users are required to authenticate themselves before they 
can access resources. Anonymous advantage depends on different application domains. 
The FBI’s Carnivore system is an email tracking system by traffic monitoring. Web 
cookies are often analyzed by different companies to detect the customer behaviors 
commercially.  
Authentication: Authentication is another important security objective. 
Authentication is an important way to allow honest users to get into the system and 
prevent illegal users from being in the system. Specifically, as the Internet become 
pervasive, authentication becomes more important than ever before. On the Internet, 
users normally trust that a page is linked by hypertext page, but it is hard to indicate trust 
through a hypertext link. No one can tell whether www.goodbank.com is a good bank or 
not. Secure socket layer (SSL) provides secure information communication between the 
browser and the web server. However, other users can go to the end of information 
communication to get the transited information.  From an authentication view, you may 
need to consider where your connection goes.  
Integrity: Integrity means that the material is not changed from the original. 
Different from the authentication controlling user access, the integrity is about whether 
the material has been revised since its creation. For example, stock price in a company 
may be changed by a dishonest employee. Electronic information is relatively easy to 
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modify. Information integrity is very important in many applications (i.e. banks, other 
financial organizations).  
Other common software security attacks: Although there are many different ways 
to attack, I have only listed the most common ones. Eavesdropping means that hackers 
read data while the data travels over a network. Tampering means that hackers revise data 
while the data is in travel. Spoofing means that hackers use bogus data to give the false 
impression about the valid data. Hijacking means that hackers alter data on the Internet 
with their own data while delivering the data. For example, when a user launches a FTP 
connection, hackers can control the connection by submitting bogus packets [95]. This 
category in hijacking has some relationship with the spoofing. 
 
2.1 Security Analysis Model 
As we discussed before, the software security goals are addressing preventions, 
traceability, auditing, monitoring, privacy and confidentiality, multilevel security, 
anonymity, authentication, and integrity. The Internet has fundamentally changed the role 
that software plays in business [95], [97]. Software project goals are emphasizing 
functionality, usability, efficiency, time-to-market, and simplicity. Generally, two sets of 
goals can occasionally conflict with each other. For example, aggressive software code 
reviews to reduce vulnerabilities may postpone time-to-market, or good usability in 
software systems may not maintain the system simplicity in web-based applications. 
Multilevel security may reduce the efficiency in productivity and communications. It is 
hard to determine which is more important. The decisions are very different and are 
greatly affected by business objectives and other concerns [97].  
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In the Internet era, software does not only run on a local computer machine 
anymore, but instead provides direct access to information everywhere. The most 
challenging problem is that many computer professionals do not know exactly what the 
security problem is. Even if you have the best firewall, when the firewall opens a port to 
allow a remote user access, the software systems are remotely exploited. The firewall 
does not prevent attacks from the open ports. Strong encryption is not an effective way to 
protect data from attackers also. Attackers can go to the end of communications and steal 
data [95].  
Three-tier architecture for the web-based applications has also become pervasive 
quickly. There is a web client in the front end. In the back end, there is an information 
manager system (database server). Shortly, hospitals develop their web-based health care 
information systems.  Banks develop their online bank systems [96], [108]. As the web-
based applications are developed, the performance and availability of the Internet 
receives more attention. Quality-of-service (QoS) metrics in response time, throughput, 
and availability are widely discussed [58].  
The major challenge in the Internet nowadays is response time, throughput, and 
availability. For instance, the Internet service must provide the sufficient process speed 
and average response time to meet their customer expectation. To define the relationship 
between the throughput and availability, a performance model is proposed by Menasce 
(2004) [58]. We can assume that the Internet data centers have M similar machines to 
process user requests. If each machine has a processing speed in d requests/sec, the 
highest processing speed from the working machines can be expressed as (d* M) 
requests/sec. When a machine has a failure rate at α failures/sec, a failed machine goes to 
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a waiting queue and will be repaired. It will be in operation again when the machine is 
fixed. However, there is a tradeoff between performance and availability. The cost of 
operation moves up as the throughput and availability go up. However, the failed 
machines will go back to service faster. The expected throughput TH in the Internet 
service is expressed by g machines in operation and the probability of the g machines in 
services. So, mathematically, 
∑ ∑
= =
===
M
1i
M
1j
gg M*dgpdp*(gd)TH , (1) 
where M  is defined as the anticipated number of working machines. The pg is the 
probability of g machines in services. It is related to the machine failure rate, number of 
repairmen, and expected time to bring a failed machine to work. The availability is the 
proportion of time that the service is available. From Equation (1), we can easily see the 
optimal operation strategy in the Internet data center.  
As research on the Internet performance progresses, Internet system reliability 
and security in the web-based applications become prominent challenges for information 
technology.  Attackers compromise software. Software is a root cause for common 
computer security. When your computer system does not behave properly, reliability, 
safety, or a security problem may be one of the major causes. Attackers do not make 
security vulnerabilities. They detect them and make good use of them. Poor software 
design and coding are the root causes of security vulnerabilities [95]. 
Fault is a noticeably different behavior of system characteristics from the 
accepted and normal conditions [38]. A fault is a state in the software or hardware 
system. The unusual behavior appears to have two forms: fault value and the violated 
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limit for usual value. A fault tolerant software system can keep working properly after 
software system faults occur [73], [88]. A fault-tolerant software system has the 
properties that software system faults do not result in entire system failure. Four general 
ways can be used to recognize fault-tolerant functions: 
(1) Fault detection: The system explores a fault that could lead to a system failure state. 
This may be implemented by checking whether the system state is consistent or not. 
(2) Damage evaluation: The components affected by the fault must be found out. The 
system damage will be assessed according to the severity of a fault. The potential loss 
will be estimated. 
(3) Fault recovery: The fault system comes back to a safe state. This may be realized by 
putting the damaged state back to a correct state in forward recovery or by moving the 
system back to a previous state in backward recovery. Which recovery algorithm is 
adapted depends on the specific system implementations. 
(4) Fault repair: The systems in software or hardware will be changed so that the fault 
does not happen again. Many software faults appear to be in transient states. They are 
caused by an irregular system input. The software systems do not require repairing, and 
normal operation can come back immediately after recovery. For example, in an airplan 
system, we need to estimate the severity and potential damage to the system if a specific 
part fails to function properly. We need to consider fault recovery for different parts if the 
occurring fault is critical for the system function. Furthermore, we need to make 
assessment whether we need to repair the fault if the fault occurs in the airplane.   
In the web-based application systems, many researchers have looked into the 
fault-tolerant approaches and proposed fault-tolerant web-based application systems [2], 
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[34], [39], [61], [108]. Aghdaie and Tamir (2002) developed a fault-tolerant web service 
by kernel support [2]. Their implementation applied a client-transparent mechanism to 
fault-tolerant services. The revised kernel required to multicast the messages to a web 
server and a backup server. The backup server delivered a reply to the requested client 
when a primary web server failed. An example for modifying the Linux kernel and the 
Apache web server was provided. The analysis for the performance in throughput, 
latency, and consumed processing cycle time was conducted. Janakiraman et. al. (2005) 
proposed a Cruz system which used system checkpoints to restore application state at 
user and OS levels [39]. The fault-tolerant mechanism was realized by recovering 
applications from a failure using backward recovering algorithm. Hong et. al. (2005) 
proposed a replication of information by multiple servers for the Internet banking systems 
[34]. A dispatcher was used to coordinate web client requests among web servers. 
Multiple dispatchers were established to improve the web services with fault-tolerant 
capability. Their approaches can be summarized in four aspects: 1). use replicated servers 
to improve system reliability; 2). use multiple phase commit protocol to deliver requested 
services; 3). kernel-level and web server modifications to support logs of requests and 
delivery information; and 4). multiple dispatchers or coordinators are deployed to 
increase system fault-tolerance. These approaches provide a good solution to the web-
based applications with fault-tolerant functions.   
 As the Internet become essential to many applications, the computer systems 
become more vulnerable than ever before. Attacks are observed very frequently in 
different software systems [25], and incidents are reported in many different application 
domains. To face current situations, studies have been conducted in intrusion-detection 
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and intrusion-tolerant systems [25], [29], [55]. This work centers on security-tolerant 
system development by measuring the security attributes of an intrusion-tolerant systems. 
Traditional security techniques are not sufficient to handle these challenges; therefore, the 
fault-tolerance approach to security becomes a cost-effective option [25]. Intrusion can be 
treated as a special fault in a fault-tolerant system.  In this approach, internal errors are 
separated from the external failures. All the fault-tolerant methods rely on detection and 
recovery from the internal approaches. The distinction between internal error and root 
cause is important. One noticed deviation in a system could be caused by different 
factors: a usage profile, an accidental fault, and a disaster fault. An intentional fault is 
defined as an intrusion [25]. An intrusion happens when an attack successfully detects a 
weak point in software systems.  
Attacks are a special kind of human activity. When paralleling the security to a 
fault, there are three types of fault-prevention methods. First, there is attack prevention in 
a human sense. For example, in the web-based applications, we need to prevent human 
attacks to our systems since the web-based applications have open access nature. Second, 
attack prevention can be in a technical sense. In the web-based applications, we need to 
prevent technical attacks to our systems as they are directly related to the reliability of the 
web-based applications. Third, fault prevention can also be vulnerability prevention. The 
vulnerability prevention may take several approaches. The approaches contain formal 
specification, good design, code reviews, and user education. Vulnerability prevention 
can reduce the vulnerability from the root cause.  
Fault removal may take place during software development in verification and 
validation process or after the product is in operation. Fault removal can be realized in: 
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(1) Attack removal in human sense. In the web-based applications, we need to mitigate 
the rate or level of human attacks to our systems below the allowed threshold. (2) Attack 
removal in technical sense. In a web-based application, we need to mitigate the rate or 
level of technical attacks to our systems below the allowed threshold. (3) Vulnerability 
removal. In the software development cycle, formal proof, model checking, and code 
reviews can help to identify code flaws which carry potential security problems in the 
future. When software systems are in operation, vulnerability removal can be 
implemented using security patching, removing a specific service, etc. Vulnerability 
removal can improve the system security tremendously. Intrusion tolerance means that 
systems are reliable enough to continually perform the planned services when an 
intrusion occurs.  
Fault forecasting is about evaluating the fault prevention, removal, and tolerance 
methods. Fault forecasting has: (1) Attack forecasting in human sense. In our web-based 
applications, we need to predict future attacks and hazards from human activity. (2) 
Attack forecasting in technical sense. In our web-based applications, we need to predict 
future attacks and hazards from technical sides. (3) Vulnerability forecasting. We predict 
future vulnerabilities and potential hazards from our existing knowledge. Correct 
predictions can help us to assess potential vulnerability, estimate potential damage loss, 
and prepare for immediate response if the threat from a vulnerability becomes real. Sousa 
et. al. (2005) introduced a system model to represent an exhaustive-safe system [88]. Ye 
et. al. (2004) evaluated the Markov Chain Model for cyber-attack detection in Unix 
Solaris systems [104]. They found that the Markov Chain Model is better for cyber- 
attack detection than the chi-square distance test method for low noise level in the data. 
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The Markov Process Model has been applied to different applications. The 
Markov Chain Model has “memoryless” characteristics. The Markov model has the 
properties that state the future is only dependent on the present state [26]. For a web-
based application, security risks are most correlated with the current software systems 
and hardware systems. So, current system state has a decisive impact on the system 
security in the future. System security risk has a kind of “memoryless” nature which the 
Markov Model also holds. On the other hand, the Markov Chain Models have been used 
in some studies [51], [101]. Since web vulnerable risk is highly related to web access 
traffic, security risk in the systems appears to have similar pattern as access traffic cross 
time. The more access traffic to web applications, the more security risks the web-based 
application systems may experience. Therefore, security in the web-based applications 
can be approximately modeled by the Markov Chain Model.  
Jones et. al. (2006) modeled the security and vulnerabilities in facility 
infrastructures [41]. They used a network graph to express the system architecture. The 
model provided the break-in probability estimation for security breaches. Software risk 
management consists of security, reliability, and safety. However, software risk 
management is a relative new subject [95]. A common joke about the most secure 
computer: the computer has its disk removed and power off. As a result, the most secure 
computer is functionless. Good risk control needs professional knowledge in application 
domains. The security officer must be able to separate known attacks and possible 
vulnerabilities in the system. When risks have been explored, we can rank the risk in 
severity. Risk identification and severity ranking will decide resource allocations for 
further analysis and mitigation. Resource allocation is a business-decision process based 
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on good data. Mitigation for the vulnerability depends on good knowledge about the risk, 
proper assessment for the potential damages, and good strategy in response to the 
vulnerability. The goal of mitigation is to prevent the risk occurrence.  
Network security analysts tend to approach security problems from a network 
perspective. They tend to address the security in firewalls, intrusion detections, and 
policy control, etc. When the security analysts and software developers meet together, the 
result is not as good as we expect. Security evaluations for software systems are normally 
conducted at the end of a project. This can easily lead to a disagreement because the 
software developers may think of the reviewers as nonprofessionals in programming. 
There are two popular approaches used by security analysts to address software security: 
black box testing and red teaming approach [97].  
Black box testing: Black box testing is not as productive as white box testing 
(understand the architecture of codes and then develop test cases). In the views of Viega 
and McGraw (2002), a risk analysis directs the testing activity [95]. We need to make a 
trade-off with security. The black box testing for security functions is inefficient; this 
method does not make good use of the system architecture. The black box testing can 
detect implementation errors, but misses errors regularly. Most of the black boxing tests 
look for surface errors.  
Red Teaming Approach: The red teaming approach lets a team attack the software 
systems as hackers. The test allows a group of people with different experience to break 
into the systems without giving any instructions. If the testers cannot detect any 
problems, the program may be good. If they do find some problems, one analysis 
between root cause and potential risk is conducted. We can fix the problems. However, 
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the claims about the systems that have some problems could be misleading. Previous case 
studies indicate that it takes a lot of time and effort to discover security problems. People 
in the red team approach may have different experiences, but the efforts taken by the red 
team approach may not be sufficient. Real hackers may invest a lot of time and effort into 
attacking your software systems. The red team approach could only look into the surface 
errors because of the time limitation. 
An efficient way to reduce vulnerabilities is to conduct a security code review 
(Howard 2006) [36], [97]. In the code review, we need to know what we are looking for, 
then rank our tasks in priority order, and finally examine the code. In the first phase, 
Microsoft often establishes a review group consisting of some senior and new reviewers. 
The reviewers discuss different review strategies, and are encouraged to learn from each 
other. If the reviewer is totally new, s/he may need to check some popular websites (i.e. 
www.securityfocus.com, Bugtrag, etc.) for references very often. In the second phase, 
ranking all the tasks in priority is very important. Howard prioritizes the code review to 
address old software systems, programs running by default, programs running at a higher 
privilege, anonymously accessible program, programs listening on the Internet, software 
systems written in low language levels (for example: assembly), software systems with a 
history of security problems, software systems that interact with a security-sensitive data, 
larger complex software programs, and frequently updated programs. In his view, an old 
software program is likely to carry more vulnerabilities because modern developers can 
address security issues better. 
Attackers frequently make good use of the program running by default. This kind 
of running program provides more opportunities to attackers. Program running in a 
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higher access right has a potentially serious problem because the program has more 
access to the software systems. A program that listens on the Internet is open to attackers 
remotely and locally, while a program written in lower level languages (i.e. assembly) 
provides easy access to hardware (i.e. memory). Buffer-operation can result in buffer 
overflows. A program that has had vulnerabilities in the past is more likely to have 
vulnerabilities again in the future. Programs that deal with sensitive data are important 
because we do want to preserve the data confidentiality and integrity for all software 
systems. Larger software programs often have more vulnerabilities inside the system 
because it is difficult to detect and debug them. It is also easy to add new vulnerabilities 
to frequently revised programs. To review a program, we need to use all code analysis 
tools, look for common security problem patterns, and investigate deeply into the 
programs. For a specific system, we need to analyze the system characteristics and 
compare these characteristics with the points discussed above. We pay particular 
attention to the system with the potential problems listed in Howard’s paper.  
The web-based applications are exposed to security threats by worms, viruses, 
spoofing, and many others [54]. In the past, Internet-based attacks have been widely 
waged against the web-based application systems. Lu. et. al. (2005) applied the 
technology acceptance model to the perceived risk analysis for online applications with 
security threats [54]. Their results indicated that the perceived risk highly influences 
continuous users.  Conceptually, for a user who frequently uses online banking systems, 
he/she may pay greater attention to the perceived risk related to online transaction 
security. The perceived risk and related threats can restrict the user’s desire to continue 
using online services. Risk metrics can measure assets, threats, and vulnerabilities in a 
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software system (Peterson 2006) [71]. Taking into consideration all of the related 
elements, we can produce a risk management model. Based on the risk model, we can 
then manage or mitigate various risks. In a web-based application, the risk is different 
from uncertainty because it is measurable. A lot of vulnerabilities are well-known to the 
public so that we can reduce their impact to some degree. However, the measurement 
method is not standardized yet. Threats to a system have a lot of uncertainty because the 
threat can be affected by many factors.  Vulnerability management includes vulnerability 
evaluation, remediation, and redistribution.  In a risk calculation equation, assets have a 
value. We can estimate the asset value from the expected loss. Schechter (2005) at MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory defines [81]: 
 Security risk = (chance_of_security_breach) x (cost_of_security_breach)  (2)  
When a system has multiple security problems, it is reasonable to define security 
risk by the frequency or expected rate of breaches. Therefore,  
Security risk = (security_breach_rate) x (average_cost_per_breach) (3) 
Most recently, Linstrom (2005) and Ravenel (2006) defined [52], [76]: 
Risk = threat x vulnerability x expected_loss (4) 
 This is one of the most practical measurements for computer system security.  In 
this equation (4), Linstrom (2005) and Ravenel (2006) introduced the expected loss [52], 
[76]. Lee and Shao (2006) developed a new method to estimate IT security loss [49].  
Previously, IT security analysts used two major methods to estimate IT security benefits: 
annual loss expectancy (ALE) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The ALE is computed by 
the expected loss and the rate of loss for each attack in the attack rate over a specific time 
period. Lately, the risk ranking method and management efficiency model are developed 
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based on the previous work. However, these models are subjective and time-consuming. 
It is difficult to obtain an accurate estimation in a good time manner. The cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) takes the risk-adjusted costs to approximate the internal return rate and 
total net value in order to calculate the ratio of the inputs to profits. To apply CBA, a cost 
metric is applied to appraise the damage, response, and operational costs. This approach 
is popularly adapted by the US National Institute of Health. The cost metric seems to be 
varied in to a large degree. In Lee and Shao’s approach (2006), a stochastic model is 
developed for estimating the expected loss. Their model appears to be a better 
measurement. More recently, Whitehat security (www.whitehatsec.com) and Applied 
Research Associates Inc. propose that the security risk is measured by threat and 
vulnerability without the expected loss term [30], [78]. My understanding is that the 
expected loss can be a kind of subjective measurement. It may change with different 
application domains even if we have the same web-based software system. So, the 
security risk can be expressed as: 
Risk = threat x vulnerability (5) 
In this dissertation, the vulnerable behavior and system response will be analyzed. 
The analyses will focus on availability-related aspects: the probability of moving the 
web-based applications to a particular security-failed state and the mean time to the 
security failure of a system. The security analysis in the steady-state will be determined 
using the Markov chain analysis. The system security risk index will be classified in three 
levels as an indicator of the level of security risk at low risk level, high risk level, and 
failed risk level. The vulnerability risk analysis will be measured by a group of security 
experts in the web-based application systems. The measurement justification is taken 
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using information entropy weight coefficient to counter the subjective factors from the 
security expert assessments.   
 
2.2 Security Improvement 
When users get access to a computer system, the system will decide the resource 
for each user access [96]. Many access control models have been proposed to address this 
policy. Some complicated models have been developed in distributed systems. Access 
control in Unix and Windows is realized by using Access Control Lists (ACLs). In a 
Unix system, each user is identified by the user ID (UID). An individual group has a 
group identity (GID). Based on the resource allocation policy, we can set access 
privileges for each user and each group. In a similar way, Windows also have security 
IDs corresponding to different users and groups. Windows may use several types of 
tokens for access control implementations. The access token stores the information for 
the different authenticated users. When determining a particular access, the security 
modules check with the access token to make an access decision. For a more detailed 
discussion, please refer to the “Building secure software” book by Viega and McGraw 
(2004) [98]. Other systems, different from Windows and Unix, have their own control 
mechanisms similar to the ACLs.   
The objective of information system security is to preserve systems and ensure 
that they have proper utilizations according to the specific policy [96]. The information 
security specifically addresses confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability in 
the resource access and allocation [42]. Access control has been widely used in 
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information security area. Access control can specify a user’s access right and when the 
user has access to the allocated resources [45], [96].  
The distributed and loosely coupled architecture of the web-based applications 
present a big challenge in verifying credentials in access control [22]. Though access 
control for web services has been studied, no specific architecture has been publicly 
accepted. For web services, four key elements are important in security. These elements 
are resources, policies, validation, and management [107]. Resources consist of the 
participants in organizations, developers, and customers in the project development life 
cycle. Policies are the guidelines that determine the factors in security breaches. 
Validation processes check software related security attributes and confirm the software 
system is working as designed. A combination of software attributes in dependability, 
interoperability, and fault tolerance is a major consideration for validation [66]. 
Management is observing web projects in development life cycle closely [95], [107].  
The GeoIP services are database systems that convert an IP address to its physical 
location. The GeoIP services work easily with other software systems [64]. The GeoIP 
services can convert 4.3 billion used IP addresses to the corresponding locations. When 
integrating the GeoIP services with a web server, the web server can identify the location 
of a remote user without additional effort. The physical location information contains an 
IP address and its geographical information. Using the GeoIP services with the role-based 
access control will improve the security for the web-based applications [96]. As the 
second objective of this dissertation, I will present the specification and implementation 
architecture for a secure web-based application. 
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CHAPTER III 
  
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
3.1 Goal of the Research 
The purpose of this research has two aspects. First, system security and risk 
analysis will be explored. The goal of the research is to develop measurement methods 
for security and vulnerability risk for the web-based applications as these applications 
have become a major computing platform. Second, I develop a security improvement 
model to enhance security for the web-based applications.  
 
3.2 Description of the Research for Web-based Applications 
 Though research on information security and risk analysis has been ongoing for 
some time, no specific security analysis model exists for the web-based applications. 
Maden et. al. (2002) developed a generic security model to describe the system security 
in {good, vulnerable, attack, triage, and failure} states in an intrusion-tolerant system 
[55]. They only covered a single system without any existing subsystem interactions. In a 
typical web-based application, the whole system consists of a web client, web server, and 
database server. The subsystem interactions obviously exist. For example, a web client 
may interact with a web server so that the web client can obtain the desired data access 
from the database server. Mustafa and Fai-Bahar (1991) performed research on project 
risk assessment model [62]. Peterson (2006) developed a risk measurement metrics for 
software systems [71]. However, these models are not well validated in the web-based 
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applications because the applications have their own characteristics [10], [93]. Their 
evaluation about the vulnerability risk is a subjective-oriented measurement. This 
research tries to formalize security analysis and risk measurement for the web-based 
applications. Hopefully, the proposed methods can be standardized in the near future. In 
recent years, different access control models have been discussed. Web computing 
encounters new challenges in security every day. To meet the incoming challenges, it is 
imperative that we develop new security improvement models. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODS USED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
 In this dissertation, I will apply different research methods in security analysis, 
risk analysis, and security improvement model to the web-based applications. The 
applied methods are summarized as follows: 
 
4.1 Security Analysis Modeling 
 In the security analysis, the Markov Process Model is applied to the web-based 
application systems. Here, I will review the key component for the Markov Process 
Model Analysis [26], [80]: 
A Markov Process Y ={Yt; t≥0} has finite state space when j Є E and t, s ≥ 0 
Pr {Yt+s = j | Yu; u ≤t} =Pr {Yt+s =j| Yt} 
The Markov process has stationary transition probability if 
Pr {Yt+s = j | Yt =i } = Pr{Ys =j | Y0 =i}  
When a Markov Process has Y = {Yt; t≥ 0} has finite state E and jump times T0, T1, … 
and the embedded process at the jump time expressed by X0, X1, …. , there is a set of 
scalars λ(i) for i Є E, called the mean sojourn rates and a Markov matrix P (the embedded 
Markov Matrix) that meet the following conditions: 
Pr {Tn+1 –Tn ≤ t | Xn = i} = 1 - e -λ(i)t 
Pr {Xn+1 =j| Xn=j} = p(i,j),  
where λ(i) ≥ 0 and the diagonal elements of P matrix  are zero. 
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For the embedded Markov Chain, the analysis is summarized as follows: 
I. Identify irreducible sets in the Markov matrix P. 
II. Reorder the matrix P so that irreducible and recurrent sets on the top, transient 
states at bottom of the matrix P’. 
III. Steady-state analysis for irreducible sets using the following equations 
                  
jiji πPπ =∑
i
 and 
∑ =
j
j 1π
. 
      IV        NT = (I-Q)-1 for transient states 
                  I is identity matrix. Q is a submatrix associated with the transient states in the  
                  Markov matrix P. NT is number of visits for Markov Chain to the fixed state. 
      V          FT(i,j) = 1 – 1/N(j,j) if i = j or  FT(i,j) = N(i,j)/N(j,j) if i ≠  j, where FT(i,j) is 
                   the first passage probability that Markov chain eventually reaches state j at 
                   least once from initial state i.         
      VI         The probability fk from a transient state i to the k-th irreducible set with the 
                     sub-matrix bk can be calculated by 
                    
k
1
k bQ)(If −−=
. 
The Markov process steady-state probability pj has a relationship with Πj (the steady-state 
probability for the embedded Markov chain) as: 
∑
∈
=
Ek
kk
jj
jp λpi
λpi
/
/
 (6) 
In the first part of this dissertation, security will be analyzed using the Markov 
Process Model. The state in the Markov model is defined as the software programming 
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running conditions and data transaction process in a computer. The database server and 
web server are assumed to have sufficient speed to process the data transaction requests. 
In the web server and database server, there are multiple processes running 
simultaneously because of multiple accesses from different web clients. The web-based 
application security can be expressed in the states that describe a single subsystem (i.e. 
web server or database server) or in multiple components combined. In the embedded 
Markov Chain, the initial transition probability is estimated from the scan data. Then, the 
probability in steady-state can be calculated in the Markov Chain and Markov Process. 
The availability will be computed. The mean time to reach a security failure also can be 
calculated. To estimate security risk, equation (5) will be used. At the end of the analyses, 
an illustrative application example will be provided using real data. According to Arora 
and Telang (2005), the average vulnerability fix time in patching was 242 days for the 
CERT data (n = 186) [6]. In our case study, 242 days are used as an estimate of time span 
for state transitions from good->vulnerable->attack-> security_failed->good in the 
Markov model for data collection. So, we can approximate each state transition to have 
60 days on average. Security analysis will be conducted using scan data. Risk analysis 
will be conducted using the vulnerability data. For vulnerabilities, the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) describes vulnerability into three levels: severity, 
medium, and low [63].  High vulnerability severity allows a remote attacker to violate the 
security policy (i.e. use a higher access privilege) or allows a local attacker to obtain 
control of the system. 
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TABLE 1 
 Vulnerability Severity Levels by Grossman (2006) [30] 
 
Vulnerability severity level Descriptions 
1 Low information can be obtained by hackers on 
configuration 
2 Medium sensitive configuration information can be 
obtained by hackers 
3 High limited exploit of read and directory browsing 
4 Critical potential Trojan horses; file read exploit 
5 Urgent Trojan horse; file read and writes exploit; remote 
command execution. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Threat Evaluation Criteria by Hickman (2004) [32] 
 
Evaluation Criteria Number Description 
1 Potential damage loss 
2 Re-occurrence 
3 Exploitability 
4 Impacted users 
5 Degree of discovery 
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Low vulnerability severity means that the vulnerability does not provide valuable 
information or the control of a system. The vulnerability provides attackers some 
information and helps attackers to exploit other vulnerabilities. The vulnerability severity 
also provides some assessments for organizations about the potential risks. In my 
dissertation, I will use industry vulnerability levels which can describe the vulnerabilities 
in details. According to Jeremiah Grossman at Whitehat security (2006), vulnerability 
can be classified into five levels [30]. The five levels are described in TABLE 1. 
Vulnerability risk will be estimated in equation (5) because vulnerability severity level 
determines the degree to which hackers control the web-based application systems. The 
threat can be evaluated based on the five categories of descriptions in TABLE 2. 
Due to the uncertainty of the risk factor, fuzzy logic method has been popularly 
applied to the risk analysis. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was introduced to 
analyze the project risks by Mustafa et. al. (1991) [62]. The process uses multiple criteria 
in subjective and objective factors to assess the project risks. To overcome the 
subjectivity of a risk assessment, Zhao et. al. (2005) extended the AHP model using 
fuzzy logic method and entropy weight coefficient [109].  In the past, it was very difficult 
for the security community to collect detailed security data. Open proxy honeypots have 
been used to collect data for network security research [75]. Proxy is a software program 
which can work as a server and a client to make requests for other clients [8], [9]. Open 
proxy is a proxy server that does not have any access control and is open to access to 
other requests. The Internet connected to the proxy makes a request of the proxy server to 
access other Internet hosts.  The proxy server has both a forward proxy and reverse proxy 
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server. The forward proxy is a server that is located between the client and the origin 
server. The reverse proxy adapts the client as an ordinary server [8]. Barnett described 
how to set up an open proxy honeypot. In his approach, the first layer of control is 
implemented by a router. Then, all the listen ports are closed. Finally, the Apache web 
server is configured as an open proxy. The purpose of open web proxy honeypots is to 
collect evidence of the actual threats in the web-based applications. The data collected 
can provide a real example for security analysis after attacks, identification of new 
threats, and statistical analysis (Dacier et. al. 2004) [24]. Security data in this dissertation 
was collected by Dr. Anton Chuvakin from February to March, 2005, and posted in 
http://www.honeynet.org/scans.The data for security analysis is processed in a similar 
way to the process described by references [8], [9], [69]. The vulnerability risk data is 
collected by Purdue University in the vulnerability report in 
https://cirdb.cerias.purdue.edu/coopvdb/public from July to September, 2006 [74]. 
 
4.2 Security Improvement Model 
Formal methods are common mathematical approaches to software and hardware 
system development from requirements, specification, and design, as well as to system 
implementation [98]. The formal methods are used as theoretical tools in software 
engineering, particularly in the safe and secure systems, and these methods are also 
widely used in software testing due to their ability to reduce errors and provide a 
framework for testing.   
In the security improvement model, the formal methods are used to apply security 
to system specification. Mclean (1999) reviewed the application of formal methods in 
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computer security [56]. The results indicated that applying the formal methods to 
computer security is a cost-effective approach. Because computer security covers 
numerous threat scenarios, the formal methods are suitable for most cases. One example 
where there are difficulties in applying formal methods to applications is an investigation 
into the attacks by terrorist groups. Computer security is involved multiple features for 
different programs. As the Internet becomes omnipresent, authentication has become a 
major problem for the security. In Mclean’s words, the better we know what we are 
trying to do, the better we can make good use of formal methods. One of the big 
challenges in applying the formal methods to computer security is the difficulty to 
specify these features. Information flow is not functional property because it is difficult to 
decide whether a computer is operating with the desired function.  
Mitchell (2002) at Stanford discussed the relationship between the formal 
methods and computer security [60]. In his view, the formal methods are popularly used 
in Java bytecode verification, protocol analysis, and security trust management in access 
control policy. Future challenges in computer science rely on the capability of software 
development process improvement (design, develop, and quality control). The formal 
methods can be used in analyzing a software system from its description and 
specification. Analysis depended on specifications between the system description and 
related properties. One good example of formal methods is the TCAS system [50]. The 
TCAS is specified by the formal methods to describe how the TCAS answers to sensor 
inputs. Analyses focus on module specifications and intended functions. When all the 
modules meet the specifications, an aircraft can fly as designed. In Mitchell’s points, the 
formal methods can integrate a lot of past experience. A disadvantage of the formal 
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methods, however, is that some system features are hard to formalize. Nevertheless, the 
formal methods are still a popular approach in the software engineering areas of 
validation and verification. In the next part of my dissertation, I will apply the formal 
methods for a security system specification using role-based access control for the web-
based applications. The specifications include subject credentials, object credentials, 
access privileges, and access control algorithms in access control. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 SECURITY AND RISK ANALYSIS MODELS* 
 
5.1 General Vulnerability Scenarios in Web-based Applications 
 In a typical web-based application system, the systems have a web client, web 
server, and database server subsystems. The web server and database server may be 
located in the same local area network. However, the software systems in the web server 
and database server are very different. In the web-based application systems, the database 
server normally stands alone. The computer with the database server typically does not 
have too many other network applications (i.e. a web browser) on the machine. In 
general, the web client and the web server do not belong to the same local area network. 
So, the software systems on the web clients and the web server tend to be divergent. The 
database server is hidden to public computer users in general (domain name and IP 
address). However, computer hackers have their ways to locate the database server. The 
web application vulnerability may come from software-based, hardware-based, and 
network-based aspects in general. The software-based vulnerability includes PHP scripts, 
programming buffer overflow, etc. The network-based vulnerability includes 
unauthorized access to an application system. The hardware based vulnerabilities are 
related to access to the hardware server or data. The vulnerability from the software 
systems and its related security and risk analysis are the focus of this dissertation.  
__________________ 
* Part of the chapter is reprinted from “Software security analysis and assessment for the 
web-based applications” by Yong Wang, William Lively, Dick Simmons in the 17th 
SEDE conference with permission ©ISCA 2008. 
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For many web-based applications, users are required to identify themselves before  
being allowed to use some application features [27], [35], [90]. In some systems, 
applications may not only ask users to identify their identities, but also to confirm who 
the individuals are supposed to be. In a web client, the web applications use one of two 
standards to download executable programs over Internet: Java applets and ActiveX 
controls. The ActiveX is a modular of dynamic link library. It is developed by Microsoft 
using DCOM (distributed component object model) or COM technology. ActiveX can be 
used to download or run programs.  For example, an ActiveX downloaded file from a 
web site can be run by a javascript in the other web browser. The early Java used a 
security mechanism: sandboxing. Sandboxing is a programming running environment to 
run other software. The sandboxing allows the program from others to run inside a 
security area and controls the applet to access outside areas. 
In the web server, the first type of vulnerabilities is directly related to 
programming languages used in the web-based applications. One popular vulnerability in 
the web server is to provide application data to an unauthorized user. The programs that 
carry vulnerabilities often appear in CGI (common gateway interfaces) scripts, SSI which 
is the server side include for html markers, ASP pages (active server pages), and many 
other application programs. The second kind of vulnerabilities comes from invalid input 
data in the web-based applications. For example, most inputs for web servers do not have 
good mechanisms for checking if input parameters are correct or not. 
In database servers, the most popular attack is the SQL injection attack [29]. The 
SQL injection is a group of unverified user input problems. The web applications run the 
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SQL code that was not planned using string operations. The SQL strings are produced on 
the fly and run using string replacement or other operations. The SQL injection can create 
some real problems for the web-based application systems [35]. 
For example, a form is popularly provided to input a username and password for 
data retrieval in a web-based application. Let us assume that we know a valid login name 
in the database server is JohnDoe. We run a query using JohnDoe’- - as a username to get 
into the database server. In the above statement, adding single quote and comment 
characters to the name allows attackers to login as JohnDoe without the valid password. 
The comment characters (- -) tell the SQL server to ignore all of the remaining statement 
without any authentication. If we don’t know any valid login name on a database server, 
we can add ‘JaneDoe’ as a new user; INSERT users VALUES (‘JaneDoe’, ‘password’); -
- into a login name field. The single quote closes the login name string. The semicolon 
indicates there is a second statement. The comment characters after the INSERT 
statement instruct the SQL server to ignore the password. The first time the attacker 
submits this login name, he probably receives an “access denied” message from the SQL 
server. The comment characters in the string tell the server to ignore passwords without 
any authentication. After the first time, the attacker has created a valid user in “JaneDoe” 
as login name and “password” as password in the SQL server. The attackers can 
unlimitedly access the SQL server after his first attempt [28], [35]. 
 
5.2 Vulnerability and System Responses in Web-based Applications 
Maden et al. (2002) developed a generic state transition diagram in discrete time 
Markov chain for intrusion- tolerant [55], [97]. In their approach, they defined that 
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intrusion tolerant software systems start running from a good state, then transfer to a 
vulnerable state when the system fails to stand. When attackers identify a vulnerability 
successfully, the systems move to an attack state. When the software systems discover 
the attack, the systems move to the triage state (the state in which the system looks for 
possible ways to respond to an attack to limit the damage) to reduce the potential loss. If 
the attack is successful, the systems move to a security-failure state. The system might be 
shut down to fix the security problems in confidentiality, privacy, and data integrity. This 
action may result in the service being unavailable. In the web-based applications, a 
transaction starts from a web client. The web client sends its request to the  
  
After fix 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. System state transition diagram for web-based applications. 
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web server by sending TCP packets to ask for the desired data. When the web server 
receives the request from the web clients, the web server will authenticate the requested 
users by the user credentials. If the user can pass the web server authentications, the web 
server will retrieve the requested data from the database server. So, the web-based 
application systems consist of the web client, web server, and database server subsystem.  
In this analysis, we can conceptually assume that there are unlimited web clients possible 
to attack the web server and database server. So, the web clients are not a major target for 
attacks in security analysis in our web-based system. I assume that the web clients are 
secure in our modeled systems since the web clients are well distributed in the world, and 
it is very difficult to collect the data for all the potential web clients due to scattered 
distribution and data privacy concerns.  
Although some researchers have modeled a computer systems in {good, 
vulnerable, attacked, and failure} states in the conceptual model [55], it is very difficult 
to separate vulnerable and attack states from the log data. So, here, I use an attacked state 
to represent the combination of vulnerable and attack states in Fig. 1. From the data 
collected, no data indicates that there are direct attacks from the web server to the 
database server. In the analyses, each subsystem is assumed to start from the good state. 
If the attacker detects a vulnerable point and wages attacks in the subsystem, the 
subsystem moves from a vulnerable state to an attack state. Each subsystem, after the 
attacks, either moves to a security-failure state or moves back to a good state if it has 
some intrusion-tolerant mechanisms. Each subsystem interaction also exists in the web-
based applications. For example, the web client in the good state may directly launch 
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attacks on the database server without passing the web server in the good state. To outline 
our descriptions above, the state interaction diagram for the web-based applications is 
presented in Fig. 1. Fig. 1 is the case when a web client launches attacks on the web 
server and database server simultaneously. When having multiple process accesses to the 
web server or database server, the system interactions can be described using multiple 
diagrams in Fig. 1, multiple partial diagrams from Fig. 1, or a mixture of whole diagrams 
and partial diagrams in Fig. 1. 
An attacker attempts to move the web-based applications to a security failure 
state. However, this attempt needs attackers to invest their efforts. These efforts can be 
described using time and modeled as a random variable.  The random variable in time is 
assumed to have exponential distribution. In general, an attacker can only sometimes 
move the system to a security failure state. Each subsystem in the web server and 
database server can be modeled by {good, attacked, failed} states in the state transition 
diagram. So, we use exponential distribution to model multiple state transitions for the 
web-based applications. For example, the Nimda worm attacks web servers using file 
permissions, character decoding, directory traverse vulnerability. Finally, the Nimda 
worm moves the web server from good state to attacked state, then from attacked to a 
security failure state. Because there are multiple components in the applications, the 
system state may be described using more than one component. For example, one of the 
system states may be in (web_server_good, database_server_good) state in the Markov 
Process. 
When attacks occur, the software systems try to move back to a secure state from 
a compromised state [97]. As Sommerville (2004) pointed out, many software faults are 
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transient [88]. No specific action is taken to correct the system. The faults may disappear 
in the system’s next execution.  When this is not the case, some actions are taken to 
repair.  Each subsystem may move to a security failure state. Griffin et al. (2005) 
concluded that a system responding to an attack is similar to a system responding to 
accidental faults [31]. In the web-based applications, the system will be modeled by 
Markov Process with embedded Markov chain. The discrete state space E = 
{(web_server_good, sql_server_good), (web_server_attacked, sql_server_attacked), 
(web_server_good, sql_server _security_failed), (web_server_good, sql_server_good),  
(web_server_attacked, sql_ server_attacked),  
(web_server_ attacked, sql_ server_security_failed),  
(web_server_good, sql_ server_good),  
(web_server_security_failed, sql_server_attacked)}.  
To model the web-based applications in the Markov Process, we need the mean 
sojourn time in each state and initial transition probability pij from state i to state j in the 
Markov Model, where i, j Є E.  
In the following context, we will use listed abbreviations to represent system 
states in the web-based applications: 
(wsg, sqlg): (web_server_good, sql_server_good),  
(wsg, sqla): (web_server_attacked, sql_server_attacked),  
(wsg, sqlf): (web_server_good, sql_server _security_failed),  
(wsa, sqlg): (web_server_good, sql_server_good),  
(wsa, sqla): (web_server_attacked, sql_ server_attacked),  
(wsa, sqlf): (web_server_ attacked, sql_ server_security_failed),  
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(wsf, sqlg): (web_server_good, sql_ server_good),  
(wsf, sqla): (web_server_security_failed, sql_server_attacked).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sqlf 
 
 
 
 
sqla  
 
 
sqlg 
                   
     
                            wsg                        wsa                                   wsf                                              
Fig. 2. System state transition in the web-based applications (Revised from Wang, 
Lively, and Simmons (2008) [97]).  
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The system state transition diagram in the web-based applications in the Markov 
Process is described in Fig. 2. In the embedded Markov Chain, a state’s space can be 
classified into transient sets and irreducible sets. When a closed set of states that do not 
have a subset which is also closed, this type of subset is defined as an irreducible set. All 
states in an irreducible set belong to the same classification [94]. The steady-state 
probability can be calculated for different states in the embedded Markov Chain and the 
Markov Process.  
In the web-based applications, we are specifically interested in system security in 
software. Hollar and Murphy (2006) summarized the security goals in web application 
triangle in integrity, confidentiality, and availability [33], [97]. In their notations, 
availability is the probability that a system can provide the intended service at a point in 
time when customers need them. For example, the availability can measure successful 
resource allocation rate to incoming requests in the web-based applications. Integrity is 
related to the correctness of the application data. Software security can prevent 
unauthorized people from changing the data. Confidentiality means that information must 
be kept private. The software system is expected to prevent information from 
unauthorized access. Which attribute is more important to the software system depends 
on different application domains. For example, patient information systems are more 
interested in confidentiality because the patient information is critically private. Bank 
information systems pay more attention to integrity. These systems always need to have 
correct numbers for their customers. When any of these attributes in the web-based 
applications are compromised, the action will lead to the application system security 
failure. The system security failure can be modeled by the Markov Process.  
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 In a web-based application, any security failed states from the integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability will finally lead to system unavailability. In this case, the 
system needs to be fixed before it can operate properly again. To compute the mean time 
to security failure, we treat the security failure states as absorbing states so that we can 
conduct analyses for the Markov Process Model. In the next section, I will conduct 
analyses for the system functional availability and the mean time to a security failed state.  
 
5.3 Availability Analyses 
 In the reliability area, Menasce (2004) and Trivedi (2001) defined the system 
availability using mean time to failure, and mean time to recovery [57] [94]. The web-
based application systems will be shut down to fix the security problems if the system 
security fails. If any subsystem reaches a security failed state, the entire web-based 
applications will be considered as security failure because the system cannot support the 
requested services. Availability can provide a measurement for immediate access rate to 
the web-based applications to achieve desired services. 
 Let Av be the functional probability that the entire system can provide the 
intended services properly [97]. We want to derive the steady-state functional availability 
A as the time moves to the unlimited. In our security model, the entire system will not be 
able to provide the intended service when the web-based applications arrive at any state 
of {(wsg, sqlf), (wsa, sqlf), (wsf, sqlf), (wsf, sqla)}. When there are different 
vulnerability attacks existing both in the web server and database server, the system 
availability can be calculated as:  
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Av = 1-p(wsg,sqlf) – p(wsa, sqlf)  - p(wsf, sqla) - p(wsf, sqlg),  (7) 
where (wsg, sqlf), (wsa, sqlf), (wsf, sqlf), (wsf, sqla), and (wsf, sqlg) stand for the 
different states described before, respectively.  Pstate indicate steady-state probability in a 
security failed state in the Markov Process. When systems only have database server 
attacks existing, we can treat the SQL server as in good state. Thus, the availability can 
be expressed as: 
 Av = 1-p(wsf, sqlg). 
Mean Time To Security Failure (MTTSF): In a web software system, it is 
common that the mean time to failure is used to describe software reliability (Tian et. al. 
2004) [10], [93]. The mean time to failure (MTTF) measures the expected time for a 
system to reach the failure state from a good state. To parallel mean time to failure in 
software reliability to man time to security failure, mean time to security failure measures 
the expected time for a system to reach the security failure state from a good state. Mean 
time to security failure is an important system parameter to measure system reliability 
from a security aspect. The parameter can describe how long the system can provide 
trusted services. MTTSF is computed by making the states of the embedded Markov 
Chain in security failure into absorbing states. Classification of the Markov process 
states, into absorbing and transient states, relies on the nature of the analysis. For 
example, a vulnerability exists in the web server in a web-based application system and 
no other vulnerability exists. A web client launched a malicious attack to move the web 
server to a security failure state. The attack is modeled by different states in the Markov 
Process Et = {(wsg,sqlg), (wsa, sqlg), (wsf, sqlg)} states. Ea={(wsf, sqlg)} is considered 
as an absorbing state. When the web application systems move to the security-failed state 
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and the active security breach in software systems exists, this security failure state 
actually becomes an irreducible set in the Markov Process Model [97]. 
For the Markov Process, we calculated the mean time to security failure as 
follows: 
As discussed in the method [26], [80], [94], [97], we have Markov matrix P for 
one-step transition probability in the Markov chain. P can be reorganized as P’ 
 
 
1     
 1    
  1   
   …  
 
 
P’      = 
b1 b2 b3 … Q 
 
where bk is a sub-matrix with the one-step probability of describing transient state i to 
irreducible set. Sub-matrix Q from the Markov matrix P represents the transition 
probabilities between the transient states in one-step transition. The mean time to security 
failure can be calculated using the following operation: 
N(i,j) = (I –Q)-1(i,j). (9) 
where N(1,j) is the average number of times the state j (j Є Et) is visited in the Markov 
chain before the Markov chain arrives at one of the absorbing states from the beginning 
state. 
When we obtain the mean sojourn time in state j (Tj), the MTTSF can be computed by: 
 
∑
∈
=
tE
jT1jNMTTSF j . (10)  
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5.4 Vulnerability Risk Analyses 
 In the previous sections, I developed a security analysis of availability and mean 
time to security failure. However, the root cause of system security failure is software 
vulnerability. Using existing vulnerabilities, I will develop vulnerability based security 
risk assessment to quantify software systems. 
In the security risk analysis, the security risk is positively related to the threat, 
vulnerability, and the expected loss from the vulnerability according to equation (4).  In 
the security risk model, the expected loss is related to the protected asset. The protected 
assets at hardware level may include storage and communication devices. At software 
level, the protected assets may include data storage system, utility programs, operating 
systems, and other applications [105]. There are several common attack threats for 
software systems. These are spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, 
denial of service, and elevated access right, etc [95]. Attackers in spoofing claim to be 
some other identities. Whereas attackers in tampering try to revise information while it is 
in a travel or stationary position. Furthermore attackers in repudiation conduct some 
actions that are difficult to identify. While attackers in information disclosure also try to 
obtain data by stealing. Meanwhile attackers in denial of service prevent systems from 
normal operations. Finally attackers in elevated access right conduct some unauthorized 
activities in systems [95].  
The Web Application Security Consortium (2004) has classified web threat into 
several categories [9], [99]. The threats include authentication, authorization, client-side 
attacks, command execution, information disclosure, and logical attacks. In 
authentication, threat may come from insufficient authentication and weak password 
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validation. For insufficient authentications in the Apache web server, there is a directory 
/admin that is similar to the root directory. If hackers get into this directory, they can and 
will look through all the other directories. Weak passwords are passwords shorter than six 
characters. The passwords would not be changed for a long period of time, and 
sometimes, the passwords repeated the old password. In the Internet era, the users may 
come from local or remote websites from the host country to the other countries. 
Authentication in a distributed web-system presents a big challenge for user identity 
validation. In authorization, authorization threat may come from credential prediction in 
controlling web users. Authorization threat may come from insufficient session 
expiration in using previous session credentials for authorization in the web-based 
applications. These two categories of threats now pose a high risk for information 
security since these two categories decide the access control. In command execution, a 
threat may come from buffer overflow, format string attack in using string library to 
access the physical memory, operating system commands in controlling application input 
parameters, and SQL injections in the web-based applications.  For example, you may 
define a char buffer [11] in your program written in C. Then, you may input some strings 
as char data [] = argv[0] from command line. Finally, you use strcpy (buffer, data) to 
copy the input data. If your argv[0] holds a long string, it may cause allocated space with 
buffer overflow.  In information disclosure, threats may come from unauthorized 
information access from other directories and path traversal. Local attacks may come 
from misused functions in access control, denial of service in causing a website from 
normal operations, and limited process validation in the intended traffic. All these threats 
                                                                                                                                                             57
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
are highly likely to happen in the web-based applications depending on the software 
system quality, system configurations, user behaviors, and many other related factors.    
 Ravenel (2006) proposed that annual loss expectancy can be computed according 
to the threat in different phases in the software lifecycle [76]. Vulnerability severity level 
can be used to determine the vulnerability risk value in equation (5). These numbers can 
be used to calculate security risks for different organizations.  Hickman (2004) at 
SoftSource Consulting proposed a threat ranking scheme for application security [32]. In 
his approach, threats are evaluated according to several risk factors: potential damage 
loss, re-occurrence, exploitability, impacted users, and degree of discovery. Each 
category is graded from 1 to 10. Then, an average of all categories is the threat score. For 
example, if we have a threat from obtaining a root access right, the scores for each 
category are: 10 in potential damage loss, 10 in re-occurrence, 9 in exploitability, 9 in 
impacted users, and 10 in degree of discovery. So, the threat scores 9.6 on average. I will 
modify Hickman’s approach for risk evaluation in fuzzy logical method and information 
entropy-weight coefficients to make a better measurement for the web-based applications 
because the proposed score systems are very subjective. It may only work in a limited 
environment. 
 
5.5 Risk Analysis 
 Risk index will be calculated using threat and vulnerability severity level. Threat 
will be evaluated by Hickman’s approach [32]. Web software vulnerability will be 
evaluated using five different levels proposed by Grossman [30]. The risk index will be 
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calculated using fuzzy logic method developed by Zhao et. al [109]. In the following, I 
will synthesize the risk evaluations in incorporating all different pieces of the works.  
 Using the approach described by Zhao et. al. (2005), the risk factors in the web-
based applications can be described as H = {H1, H2, H3, H4, H5}, where H1, H2, H3, H4, 
and H5 stand for potential damage loss, re-occurrence, exploitability, impacted users, and 
degree of discovery respectively [109]. The security experts of web-based applications 
will give the evaluations of R matrix based on the five risk factors and evaluation rules in 
fuzzy map. The fuzzy map FZ: H-> FZ(V), where FZ(V) is the fuzzy set on V. Hi -> 
FZ(Hi) = (ri1, ri2, … rim). The risk evaluation rule set can be expressed as V = {v1, v2, v3, 
… vm}. The R matrix indicates the contribution from the risk factor Hi to the criteria in 
the evaluation set V. The R matrix can be expressed as {ri1, ri2, ri3, …, rim},  where i = 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5; m=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 
 
         r11 r12 …r1m 
         r21 r22…r2m 
R  =  …………. 
         r51 r52…r5m . 
 
(11) 
To compute the frequency of the risk factors, the weight vector in A will be assigned to 
each risk factor. The weight vector comes from the expert estimation in the web-based 
applications. Thus,  
A  = (a1, a2,…, a5)  (12) 
The weight set for the evaluation set V is defined in K vector. For different web-based 
applications, the weight for the evaluation set V varies. So,  
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K = (k1, k2,…, k7) (13) 
The risk from vulnerability i in the web-based applications can be calculated using the 
following equation (14):  
Riski = A*R*KT (14) 
where KT is the transposition matrix of K. The weight vector A is produced by the 
security experts in the web-based applications. Matrix R is the frequency of each risk 
factor Hi for the evaluation set V in the web-based applications. To overcome subjective 
evaluation, the entropy-weight coefficient will be calculated in the following equations.  
 To overcome subjective judgment [109], the relative importance of a risk factor is 
measured by: 
∑
=
−=
m
1j
ijjii )(rLn rH  (15) 
where the bigger the Hi value is, the bigger the contribution from the risk factors to the 
web-based application system is. When rij values are 1/m (j = 1,2,…,m), the Hi becomes 
the maximum with the value of Hmax in Ln(m). In the web-based applications, i = 5 and m 
= 7. The entropy of the risk factor in importance can be computed in equation (16).  
)Ln(rr
Ln(m)
1
e
m
1j
ijiji ∑
=
−=  (16) 
when rij values are all the same, entropy ei will be with the maximum value of 1. So, ei 
has a property:  0 ≤ ei ≤ 1. When an entropy is at the highest, each risk factor contributes 
the least to the system risk assessment in the web-based applications.  
Uniform 1- ei, the adjusted weight of a risk factor can be measured: 
)e(1
En
1
λ ii −
−
=  (17) 
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where ∑
=
=
n
1i
ieE  (18) 
λi satisfies: 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, and ∑ =
n
i
i 1λ . 
   In our web based applications, there are three components: web clients, web 
servers, and database servers. According to the risk theory developed by Koller (1999), 
the chance of failure (COF) is the rate from a risk category to cause a system to a failure 
[46]. When we treat multiple vulnerabilities in a subsystem as the multiple component 
risk factors in the subsystem, the total chance of success (TCOS) for a risk assessment 
with multiple vulnerabilities in one subsystem in the web-based applications can be 
calculated by: 
TCOSm = (1 – COF_vuln1) x (1- COF_vuln2) x…x (1 – COF_vulni),  
 (19) 
where vulni represents ith vulnerability in a subsystem. 
In our web-based security term, total chance of successful security (TCOS) for web-
based application can be defined as: 
TCOS = (1- web_client_security_failed) x (1-web_server_security_failed) x (1-
database_server_sceurity_failed). 
 (20) 
 I will use all the equations above in the following vulnerability based risk 
assessment. According to TCOS index, we will classify TCOS into three levels to 
indicate the web application system risk: low, high, and failed level. In statistical terms, 
we define a quartile of security index range as low and failed risk level. The high risk 
                                                                                                                                                             61
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
security level accounts for two quartiles of the index range. Thus, the threshold index for 
low system security is defined as: 25 percent of TCOS index distribution (TCOS index 
from 0 to 0.25), physically it means that the web-based application system is at failed 
level in this index range; high risk level with 26-75 percent of security index range 
(TCOS index from 0.26 to 0.75), and top 25 percent of TCOS index is defined as high 
system security level (TCOS index from 0.76 to 1.0). This means that the web-based 
application system is at a very low risk level. 
 
5.6 Case Study                                                                                                                  
5.6.1 Security Analysis  
Several web client access errors were recorded in the logs during the data 
collection time. The web client access errors are outlined in TABLE 3. In the table, I only 
present the major error types; the most frequently observed error is “File does not exist.” 
The web-based applications move the published materials very often. The second most 
frequently observed error is “Directory index forbid by rule,” an error related to the user 
violation to security policy when the web clients access the materials in the web server. 
The next most frequently observed error is “Script not found or unable to start.” This 
error is related to security policy in access privilege or program execution privilege. In 
the following paragraphs, I will present some more security issues observed in open web 
proxy honeypot in details. 
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TABLE 3 
Major Error Summaries from the Error Logs [97] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the analysis, the top ten attacker IP addresses are listed in TABLE 4. In 
TABLE 4, the top attacker IP address owners and locations are obtained using 
http://www.dnsstuff.com/tools/whois. The Internet that waved most attacks to the open 
honeypot was from IP address in 64.62.145.98. The IP address owner is Energy Group 
Inc. in Southeastern, PA. The next top attacker IP address is 210.118.169.20, located in 
Seoul, South Korea. From the IP address owners, we can see that 6 of the top 10 were 
from other countries (China, South Korea, and Romania). 4 of the top 10 attacker IP  
 
 
Major Error Type Number of Errors  
(each type) 
File does not exist 590 
Directory index forbid by rule 214 
Script not found or unable to start 70 
Attempt to invoke directory as script 17 
Premature end of script heads 21 
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TABLE 4 
Top Ten Attacker IP Addresses 
 
Attacker IP 
address 
IP address owner (location) Number of 
attacks 
64.62.145.98 Energy Group, Inc. (Southeastern,  PA) 414 
210.118.169.20 Shinbiro-IDC (Seoul, Korea) 410 
210.116.59.164 KRNIC (Seoul, Korea) 184 
4.152.207.238 Level 3 Communications (Spartanburg, SC) 94 
210.51.12.238 Tongtai IDC of China Netcom (Beijing, China) 92 
64.122.238.114 Integra Telecom (Portland, OR) 91 
220.170.88.36 Hunan Telecom (Hengyang, China) 63 
81.181.146.13 SC Mediasat SA (Romania) 55 
222.95.35.200 Jiangsu Province Network (China) 51 
4.152.207.126 Level 3 Communication (Spartanburg, SC) 46 
            
       
 
 
TABLE 5 
Top Attack Targets Are Listed [97] 
 
Requests URL Comments 
587 /_vti_bin/_vti_aut/fp30reg.dll Proxy authentication 
180 /sumthin Requested material not 
found 
97 http://www.yahoo.com Request forbidden 
materials 
93 //cgi/awstats.pl?configdir=|%20id%20| Request materials not 
found 
73 /scripts/..%255c%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe? Nimda Worm 
71 //cgi-bin/awstats/awstats.pl?configdir=|%20id%20| Request materials not 
found 
68 //cgi-bin/awstats.pl?configdir=|%20id%20| Request materials not 
found 
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addresses were from Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Oregon in the United States. The 
top attacker targets are listed in TABLE 5.  
 From the data for the top attacked targets [97], I observed that there are many 
attacks recorded in the honeypot logs. The major security problems were computer 
worms (CODE RED and NIMDA), AWSTATS attack, unauthorized access request 
(HTTP 1.0/1.1 error code 403), unidentified request method (HTTP error code 501), not 
allowed http request method (error code 405), non-http compliant requests, denial of 
service attack from Internet Relay Chat (IRC port 6666 and 6678), MS-SQL Worm 
propagation, MS-SQL version overflow, etc. 
In TABLE 4, the Nimda was observed as a major worm that spreads during the 
data collection time, for it is a self-spreading virus. It regularly attacks the Microsoft IIS 
server and outlook users. The Nimda attacks Microsoft II server using the IIS file 
permission, characters decoding execution, and unicode directory traversal vulnerability, 
but it can also attack Microsoft Outlook users using readme.exe file in an attached email. 
The Nimda can detect the vulnerability in Internet Explorer. The vulnerability fix for the 
Nimda worm is available in Microsoft website [72], [97].  
The Code Red is another worm that attacks the IIS server resulting in buffer 
overflow. It is reported that the worm activity on an infected machine is time-related to 
the machine clock [95], [97]. In TABLE 4, proxy authentication is the most severe attack 
observed. AWSTATS attack is using remote command execution. Attackers make good 
use of configuration directory to execute arbitrary commands prefixed with “|” character. 
For example, //cgi-bin/awstats/awstats.pl?configdir=|%20id%20| was observed in the 
used data. Unauthorized access request (http error code: 403) means that the web server 
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knew the request. The request did not pass the audit process. The remote request should 
be forbidden.  Unidentified request method (http error code 501) means that the web 
server does not implement the request. The web server cannot allocate any resource for 
the request since the web server can not identify the requests. Not allowed http request 
method (http error code 405) means that the requested materials do not use the 
standardized http methods as specified by the protocol. Non-http compliant requests 
mean that the http request from the web clients does not use http (hyper-text transport 
protocol) standard format. For example, get/www.utexas.edu http/1.0 is a standard 
request format in RFC2616 [8]. Attacks from IRC connections are observed from the 
open web proxy as a system operator in the channel. MS-SQL worm is a slammer worm 
that attacks database systems. There were a lot of attacks by MS-SQL slammer worm 
during the data collection period of time. All these attack activities impacted the web-
based application operations, whether earlier or later.  
As discussed before, the Code Red is a malicious worm that can self-propagate 
over the Internet. The buffer overflow in Microsoft IIS server on an infected machine is 
time-sensitive. The Code Red attack examples are presented in TABLE 6. 
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TABLE 6 
The Code Red Requests Are Exampled [97] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above, I conducted a brief security analysis in open web proxy honeypot as 
security analysis background. From the analysis, it is obvious that some software 
y0w4000@sun(~/SotM34/http)>grep default.ida access_log.* | less 
access_log.1:63.102.226.241 - - [07/Mar/2005:02:28:35 -0500] "GET 
/default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u909
0%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090
%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 
HTTP/1.0" 404 1061 "-" "-"access_log.1:63.226.106.228 - - 
[07/Mar/2005:05:46:04 -0500] "GET 
/default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u909
0%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090
%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 
HTTP/1.0" 404 1061 "-" "-" access_log.1:63.226.106.228 - - 
[07/Mar/2005:14:08:12 -0500] "GET 
(CUT remaining parts here) 
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vulnerabilities did exist in the analyzed systems since we observed different computer 
attacks, Code Red, NIMDA worm spread during data collection time. Computer hackers 
did use these vulnerabilities to break into the open web proxy honeypot. All these 
security issues are caused by either source code defects or system configurations. 
Because software vulnerabilities exist, the web-based application system may not provide 
reliable services all the time as intended. In the following, I will estimate access 
availability and mean time to security failure using Markov Process Model.  
From the data collected, the initial transition probabilities are estimated using 
access transaction rate between states in the Markov matrix P [97]. To compute mean 
time to security failure, the number of visits in each state and mean sojourn time in each 
state are required. The number of visits in each state can be calculated from state 
transition probability. Mean sojourn time in each state can be estimated as follows:  
Mean sojourn times: previous study (186 software systems) indicates software systems, 
from release in operation to a vulnerability fix, need about 242 days [6]. Let us have the 
Markov Process that spends 0.25 unit time in (wsg, sqlg), 0.50 time unit in (wsa, sqla) 
state (the attacked state is combination of web_server_vulnerable and 
web_server_attack), 0.25 unit time in (wsf, sqlg) state. For security failure from the 
attacks on the web server vulnerability only, the time to security failure experienced the 
state transitions in Et = {(wsg, sqlg), (wsa, sqlg)}, the mean sojourn time in these states 
are expressed as {T(wsg, sqlg),  T(wsa,sqlg)}.      
 Using the following equations,  
jij
i
i πPπ =∑   (21)   
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∑ =
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j 1π     (22)   
and  
∑
∈
pi
pi
=
Ek
kk
jj
j T
T
p          (23) 
 
Using equation (21) and (22), the steady-state probabilities in the embedded 
Markov Chain can be obtained:  
π(wsg,sqlg) = 0.3766, π(wsg, sqla) = 0.2561, π(wsg,sqlf)  = 0.0866,  
π(wsa, sqlg) = 0.1648, π(wsa, sqla) =0.0844, π(wsa, sqlf) = 0.003,  
π(wsf, sqlg) = 0.0245, π(wsf, sqla) = 0.0126. 
 
Using the relationship equation (23), the steady-state probabilities in the Markov 
Process can be obtained:  
π(wsg,sqlg) = 0.3487, π(wsg, sqla) = 0.2454, π(wsg,sqlf)  = 0.062,  
π(wsa, sqlg) = 0.1530, π(wsa, sqla) =0.1557, π(wsa, sqlf) = 0.0277,  
π(wsf, sqlg) = 0.0220, π(wsf, sqla) = 0.0113. 
 
The Immediate Access Availability Analysis 
 From equation (10), we can modify the equation since we assume the web client 
is a reliable part in the system and vulnerability only exists in the web server, So,  
Av = 1 - p(wsf, sqlg)   
Apply the number we got from the steady-state probabilities in the Markov Process 
Model, and the availability is: 
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Av = 1-0.022 
    = 0.978 
     
So, based on the data collected, the web-based application system has 97.8 % time to 
provide the intended services reliably. Beyond this rate, the whole system cannot provide 
reliable service because of the web server security failure. 
 
Mean Time to Security Failure (MTTSF): 
 
 (wsg, sqlg) (wsf, sqlg) 
(wsg, sqlg) 1.17 0.28 
 
N(i,j) = (I-Q)-1 = 
(wsa, sqlg) 0.57 1.17 
 
 
MTTSF = 0.4325 time units = 104.7 days, where time units = 242 days. 
This equation means that the web-based application may experience security failure after 
104.7 days in open web proxy honeypot because of multiple attacks on the web server.  
 
Validating Mean Time to Security Failure by Simulation 
 In this sub-section, I will change the probability from attacked state to security 
failure state in the web server to validate the correctness of mean time to security failure 
using Markov Process Model. The security failure probability increase in the web-server 
means that there are more attacks on the vulnerabilities in the web-based applications. 
When security failure probability decreases, this decrease means that there are fewer 
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attacks on the vulnerabilities in the web-based applications. When the security failure 
probability changes, the mean time to security failure is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean time to security failure decreases as the failure probability increases in 
the web server. 
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 From the simulation, it is clear that the web server can provide trusted services for 
longer periods of time while the system has fewer attacks on the vulnerabilities and low 
security failure rate. When the web-based application systems have more attacks on the 
vulnerabilities and higher security failure rate, mean time to security failure is reduced 
also. Conceptually, the Markov process model can calculate the mean time to security 
failure correctly. Please see Fig. 3 for details.  
  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Mean time to security failure is reduced as failure probability increases in the 
database server.   
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 When the security failure probability is changed for the database server, mean 
time to security failure is changed, similar to Figure 4. From the simulation in Fig. 4, we 
can see the mean time security failure in the database server will decrease when there are 
more attacks on the vulnerabilities. When the systems have fewer attacks on the 
vulnerabilities and low security failure rate, the web-based applications can provide 
longer trusted service. Therefore, Markov Process Model can calculate mean time to 
security failure correctly. In a similar way, I can validate the immediate access 
availability correctly by simulation. 
   
5.6.2 Security Risk Analysis 
 In the previous section, I present the case study for security measurement in 
access availability and mean time to security failure. However, the cause of security 
failure is due to the vulnerabilities. In this section, I will present a vulnerability based risk 
assessment for the web-based applications. 
From https://cirdb.ceris.purdue.edu/ccopvdb/public, we found that six well-known 
vulnerabilities were reported from July 1, 2006 to September 1, 2006. We can assume 
that all the vulnerabilities appear in our web-based application system during that time 
period. One vulnerability was reported for the database server with CVE number in 2006-
4041. According to http://www.securityfocus.com (2006), this is a SQL injection 
vulnerability when using a Postgres database server. Attackers can use this vulnerability 
remotely to run an arbitrary SQL command. As we discussed before, the SQL injection 
vulnerability can pose a high threat to the web-based application systems. Three 
vulnerabilities were reported for the web server with the CVE numbers in 2006-4089, 
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2006-3921, and 2005-3620 respectively. The CVE 2006-4089 is about multiple buffer 
overflows in AlsaPlayer 0.99.76. This vulnerability allows remote users to launch attacks 
in denial of service on a web server. AlsaPlayer is a MP3 and audio player. When the 
web server performs denial of services, basically the web server loses its intended 
functions. The CVE 2006-3921 is about the Java system application server. The 
vulnerability allows remote authenticated users to read files outside of the intended 
directory. The directory traversal can mean high security breaches for sensitive data. The 
CVE 2005-3620 is about interface vulnerabilities for VMware server. The VMware 
server integrates computer processor, memory, and other hardware into several virtual 
machines to optimize their utilization. This vulnerability is directly related to computer 
system resource allocation and management; thus, it is directly related to system 
performance. Two vulnerabilities were reported for the web clients with CVE numbers in 
2006-3918 and 2006-3574 respectively. The CVE 2006-3918 is about the IBM HTTP 
server 6.0 and the Apache HTTP server 1.3 which is not clear in defining the expected 
header from an HTTP request. This vulnerability is related to the denied web access 
requests. In previous security analysis, the data showed that the denied http request 
header can result in the information request failure. The CVE 2006-3574 is about  
 
 
TABLE 7 
The Judge Set Constructed by Probability [109] 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 
Ignorable Very low Low Medium High Very High Extreme 
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Fig. 5. The synthesized risk assessment scheme (developed based on [30], [32], [62], 
[109]). 
 
 
 
multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in a web client [75]. The cross-site 
scripting is a special defect to the web-based applications. The vulnerability exposes the 
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user data to the vulnerable web server in the cookies, which means it can be accessed by 
other unauthorized sources. Therefore, this vulnerability poses a high risk to the users 
[35]. Let us construct the fuzzy set H = {H1, H2,…,H5}, where H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 
represents “potential damage loss”, “re-occurence”, “exploitability”, “impacted users”, 
and “degree of discovery”. For the rule of risk factor, judge set S to set H is defined as S 
= {S1, S2,…, S7}, which indicates the risk level in TABLE 7.  
Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) uses many rules to estimate the values from the 
variables which are difficult to define [109]. For the risk analysis, it can be expressed as 
follows in Fig. 5.  In Fig. 5, threat is regarding computer hackers with the intent and 
ability to exploit a vulnerability in a system. Vulnerability is weak point in a system that 
can be exploited.   
 
Risk Analysis for the Database Server 
 
For the database server, only one vulnerability is reported in December 2006 
according to the access.  The experts in the web-based applications make the probability 
estimate for the risk set H. The probability of each risk factor is decided by a group of 
security experts. According to the assessments from the security experts (graduate 
students in computer science at TAMU), the subjective matrix Rp is: 
 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Rp= 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
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From equation (13), we can get ei from Rp as (0.8002, 0.8714, 0.8002, 0.8271, 
0.8714). Then the weight vector of each risk factor can be calculated in equation (16): 
Λp =  (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4, ψ5) = (0.2408, 0.1550, 0.2408, 0.2080, 0.1550). 
The weight for the judge rule in (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7) is estimated by the 
security experts as (1/10, 1/10, 2/10, 1/10, 1/10, 2/10, 2/10) in Bp, and the risk events can 
be calculated in equation (13) as: 
Pv =  Λp Rp BpT = (0.155, 0.1844, 0.2656, 0.1913, 0.1875, 0.193, 0.0155) * BpT 
     = 0.1651 
where, Λp is 1 x 5 matrix, Rp is 5 x 7 matrix, and BpT is 7 x 1 matrix. 
For the risk from this vulnerability in the database server, the judge set of the risk 
factor set V = {V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7) which shows threat severity level as in 
TABLE 12. 
 The computer security experts (graduate students in computer Science) make a 
risk assessment of the threat from the vulnerability RT as follows: 
 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
RT = 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 
 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
 
From equation (15), we can get ei as: (0.8002, 0.8002, 0.8002, 0.8271, 0.7021). 
The weight factor of each risk factor can be calculated by equation (16). The result is as 
follows: 
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Λi = (0.1867, 0.1867, 0.1867, 0.1616, 0.2784).  
The weight for the judge rule in (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7) is estimated by the 
security experts as (0, 0, 0, 1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 4/10) in Bi, and the risk event can be 
calculated in equation (13) as: 
PT =  Λi RT BiT = (0, 0.051, 0.107, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6613, 0.1769) * BiT 
     = 0.3291 
where, Λi is 1 x 5 matrix, RT is 5 x 7 matrix, and BiT is 7 x 1 matrix. 
Risk index for database server = 1-(1-Rthreat) * (1-Rvulnerability) 
                                                  = Rthreat+ Rvulnerability- Rvulnerability* Rthreat 
                                                  = 0.4399 
 
Risk Analysis in the Web Server 
For the web server, there are three vulnerabilities existing in the web server 
during the modeling time. We can treat the three vulnerabilities in the three different 
components of one system in equation (18).  
For vulnerability 1 with the buffer overflow (CVE2006-4089), RT from the expert 
evaluations is as follows:  
 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
RT = 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
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In the method described above, ei = {0.7021, 0.7733, 0.7021, 0.8271, 0.8002).  
Λi = (0, 0, 0.3228, 0.6836, 0.8383, 1.0587, 0.9014). The weight for the judge rule is as 
follows in Bi is (0, 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3)  
The risk index from the vulnerability is: 
 = Λi *RT* BiT 
 = 0.3188 
In a similar way, the threat index obtained from the vulnerability 1 is 0.3235. 
According to equation (5),  
Risk1 from the vulnerability 1 in the web server is = 1-(1-Rthreat) * (1-Rvulnerability) 
= Rthreat+ Rvulnerability- Rvulnerability* Rthreat 
= 0.3188 + 0.3235 – 0.3188*0.3235 
 = 0.439. 
For vulnerability 2 in the web server, the vulnerability is about remote 
authenticated users and their access to other documents. We can get the risk for this 
vulnerability. 
Risk2 = 0.7016 
For vulnerability 3 in web server, the vulnerability is about denial of service from 
the web server for interface of the VMware server. Using the method discussed above, 
we can get risk index as: 
Risk3 = 0.5012 
Since we can treat the three vulnerabilities in different places in the web server,  
Total chance of success (TCOS) = (1-risk1)*(1-risk2)*(1-risk3) 
                                       = (1-0.439)*(1-0.7016)*(1-0.5002) 
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                                       = 0.3257 * 0.2984 * 0.5 
                                       = 0.0841 
Risk in the web server is 1- TCOS = 0.9159. 
 
Risk Analysis in the Web Client 
For the web client, there are two vulnerabilities. The first vulnerability is about 
the unexpected header from the HTTP server, while the second is about the cross-site 
scripts vulnerabilities. In a way similar to the one described above,  
Risk1 for vulnerability1 = 0.5421 
Risk2 for vulnerability2 = 0.2348 
TCOS for the web client = (1-risk1)*(1-risk2) 
                                        = (1-0.5421)*(1-0.2348) 
                                        =0.4579 * 0.7652 = 0.3504 
Risk in web client = 1-TCOS = 1-0.3504 = 0.6496 
 
Risk Classification 
From the specifications we define, system security risk is at failed level if the 
TCOS index is from 0 to 0.25, at a high risk level if the TCOS index is from 0.26 to 0.75, 
and at a low risk level if the TCOS index from 0.76 to 1.0. For web based applications, 
we have risk measurement as: 
Total chance of success = (1-Riskweb_client)*(1-Riskweb_server)*(1-Riskdatabase_server)  
                                       = (1-0.440) * (1- 0.916) * (1- 0.6496) 
                                       = 0.56 * 0.084* 0.3504 
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                                       = 0.1646 
Because TCOS is 0.1646, the system security is very low. In other words, the 
system risk is very high, and this index indicates that the web-based application system is 
classified as a failed risk level. From the partial result, we also can see the web server has 
high-secure failure rate. If the web server has secure failure, the web client request cannot 
finish the process request, whether the database server works or not. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 In this chapter, I have conducted security analysis and vulnerability based risk 
assessment for the web-based applications. The security issues and system risk both 
originated from the software vulnerabilities. Because software vulnerabilities exist in 
web-based software systems, vulnerabilities open the door for attackers to hack the web-
based applications. The attacks on the web-based applications may cause system security 
concerns by providing immediate access to services and possibly creating security 
failures in those services. The attacks on the web-based applications also inject security 
risk in the software systems. Immediate access availability and mean time to security 
failure can quantitatively measure software system security. In this chapter, I adapt 
Markov Process Model to compute these two parameters. The correctness of mean time 
to security failure is validated by simulation. System risk assessment also provides an 
important parameter to measure system security related reliability. 
 Several different approaches have been proposed to improve software system 
security. In the next chapter, I will present a popular approach in access control to 
improve software system security.   
                                                                                                                                                             81
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
CHAPTER VI  
 
SECURITY IMPROVEMENT MODEL* 
 
A few models have been suggested to address web-based application security. 
These include coalition-based access control (CBAC) [23], discretionary access control 
(DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), and role-based access control (RBAC) [21], 
[42]. Coalition-based access control supports a variety of functionality, expressiveness, 
and flexibility for resource access specifications. The CBAC model integrates team-based 
(TMAC) and task-based (TBAC) access control together to define resource access 
policies. The discretionary access control specifies authorization rules in the subjects and 
objects. Subjects can appear to be a user, a group, and a process identifier in the web-
based applications. If a subject has control on an object, the subject can decide access 
rights to other requested subjects. Mandatory access control (MAC) specifically 
addresses the information security in confidentiality and integrity. In MAC model, 
subjects and objects are arranged in different levels and used in access decisions. For 
example, to improve information confidentiality in battle fields, MAC model may adapt a 
multilevel security mechanism to enhance its function. Multi-level information 
classification in the web-based applications can separate different types of information 
subscribers.  Role-based access control is popular for different organizations because of 
its flexibility. The role-based access control can be defined according to the 
specifications in different organizations. Role-based access control has become an 
                                               
*
 This chapter is reprinted from “Enhanced enterprise web-based application security 
using GeoIP service” by Yong Wang and Dick Simmons 2006 in the Proceedings of the 
10th IASTED SEA Conference with permission from IASTED. 
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alternative to MAC and DAC approaches [43]. Policy flexibility has made role-based 
access control more attractive in different applications.   
As role-based access control draws increasing attention, Bertino et. al. (2001) 
developed a temporal role-based access control (TRBAC) [12]. Time can play a key role 
in time-sensitive access [44]. TRBAC applies a group of temporal conditions in role 
operation. In the temporal role-based access control, a role is examined when the 
requester obtains access permissions.  
Recently, Atluri and Chun (2004) described an authorization model using 
geospatial data [7]. In their model, authorizations are defined in spatial and temporal 
attributes. Atluri and Chun thought that combining images and geospatial data would 
present more security threats than individual data itself. The access control model used a 
public geo-referenced profile to allocate user access to the different spatial data. This 
profile consists of property ownership and physical location information. When an access 
request is received, the computer system computes the specific area for authorization 
purposes. Several function operations are provided in the model. These include read, 
insert, delete, modify, and some other privileges for the different data.  
Schmit, et. al. (2005) used the web service complexity to describe two 
authorization models for indirect and direct access [82]. Indrakanti, et al. (2005) revised 
Microsoft .NET MyServices utility to define different authorization policies in the health-
care application domain [37]. The XML access control language was used in the 
extended authorization model.  
Shen and Hong (2006) proposed an attribute-based access control (ABAC) for 
web services [85]. An authorization decision relied on attributes to decide access to a 
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resource. Attributes are a group of characteristics that describe an entity. An entity is a 
subject, resource, or environment that is associated with the users and applications. There 
are several types of attributes in a web-based application: Subject attributes, resource 
attributes, and environmental attributes. Subject attributes include users, company names, 
organization names, and membership, etc. Resource attributes include resource identity, 
location, space, etc. Environmental attributes include time, date, system configurtaions, 
and other parameters. Digital credentials are composed with the attributes. In the ABAC 
model, an authorization depends on the attributes of the associated entities. The ABAC 
does not give permissions to each requester before the request is submitted. The ABAC 
also applies automated trust negotiation (ATN) mechanisms to access control, 
specifically in the authentication process [85].  Peng and Wu (2006) developed an 
algorithm to handle secure communication and access control for web-based applications 
[70]. In the secure communication, they used a secure token to authenticate the user in 
data integrity and confidentiality in a SOAP message. In authorization, they defined an 
attribute-based role access control. 
Previously, we have reviewed different access control models briefly. 
Authorization is a high level of access control for objects. The web pages, web 
applications, and etc. are some examples of the objects. Access control is for low-level 
objects. The objects include rows, tables, and documents in a data source [11], [33]. 
Hollar and Murphy (2006) classified the access control into four basic categories. These 
are user-based access control, role-based access control, attribute-based access control, 
and mandatory access control. The access model decides whether rights are granted or 
declined for a specific permission to a resource. 
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In the keys of a role-based access control (RBAC), RBAC for a system has a set 
of users, roles, resources, and access permissions. The roles contain the access rights. A 
user access to a resource is defined by a set of roles. The resource manager provides an 
access interface to the designated resources. A role-based access control model holds two 
security properties: Separation of duty and least privilege. Separation of duty means that 
the duty is assigned to different users. Least privilege means that a user is restricted by 
some roles according to the task requirements. 
 
   
 
Fig. 6. The user credential type hierarchy (revised from Wang and Simmons 2006) 
[96]. 
 
User login 
Access_ip_address 
Zip_code 
User_location 
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6.1 Authorization Model  
 
Authorization is an important approach for Internet computing. As the Internet 
becomes a major platform of computing, access authorization encounters a big challenge. 
Similar to the geospatial data authorization (Atluri and Chun 2004), the proposed model 
will adapt the subject credentials, object credentials, and access privilege for access 
control. Each subject credential normally contains several elements [7], [17], [40], [41], 
[42], [96]. The proposed model will use enhanced subject credentials in user information, 
access computer identity, and access location to combine with object credential and 
access privilege for authorization. 
 
6.1.1 Authorization Subjects 
One of the most important components for authorization is subject authorization. 
Subject authorization is about users, groups, organizations, etc. Credential types are 
expressed in the credential hierarchy tree [17]. Fig. 6 describes a user credential type in a 
hierarchy tree in the web-based applications. A credential type contains a set of attributes. 
In Fig. 6, an IP address and a zip code are the owner of the attributes of the credential 
type because of its unique characteristics. A subject may contain a set of credentials.  
Definition 1 [Credential Type]. A credential type has an unique identifier in ct_idi and  
a set of attributes in Ai corresponding to the credentials. Each attribute consists of an 
attribute name, attribute type, and an attribute mode. The attribute name is the identifier 
of the attribute. The attribute type defines the data type for the attribute. The attribute 
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model specifies the attribute in the credential type optional or required. The following is 
an example of credential–type.   
For example,  
(login_name, {(IP_address, string, required), (zip_code, integer, required), (city, string,  
optional), (state, string, optional), (country, string, required)}) 
In Fig. 5, the credential-type appears to be in a hierarchy tree. This type of credential type 
is called a credential type hierarchy. 
Definition 2 [Subject Credential Expression] A subject credential can be defined as 
{c1, c2, …}, where ci is represented as pairs (ct_id, SC). ct_id describes the credential 
type unique identifier, SC is defined as {(at1, k1), (at2, k2)…}. In the SC, ati is an attribute 
name and ki is its corresponding value for the attribute. A subject credential expression, 
for example, can be expressed as: 
Tom1 = (user, {(name, “Tom Phillips”, (ip-address, “210.325.123.20”), (physical-
location, “Houston, Texas, USA 75208”), (owner-period, [2005, now])}).  
The proposed subject credential expression is composed of an user name, computer IP 
address, geospatial location information, and temporal attributes for the valid access time.  
Definition 3 [Secure Credential Representation] If CT and SC are credential types and 
subject credential expressions for a subject identifier {sc1, sc2, sc3, …}, the credential 
expression operation is defined as: 
If k Є CT and w Є SC, k(w) is still a credential expression. When multiple credential 
expressions have a logical operation, the new expressions still belong to the credential 
expressions. 
For example,   
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Smith(w): is a credential expression to define a subject with a user name in Smith. 
Authorization will exam a credential user using the credential expressions to get user 
access right. 
 
6.1.2 Authorization Objects 
 Object authorization is also very important. It will decide how much of the 
resources will be allocated to the access requesters. Requested objects in the web-based 
applications could be online digital materials, commercial product information, or 
satellite image data [1], [7], [96]. The information format may include text, image, and 
videos. Different kinds of information may have different access protections. For a 
community development information, it may be open access. For a product technical 
support material, the product introduction material may be available to all the users, the 
detailed support information may be only open access to the specifically subscribed 
users.    
Access request on the web-based applications may be conceptually defined as the 
triple in (http_link_num, http_source_num, http_destination_num). An electronic 
document on the web can be represented in (id, slots, links, concepts), where id is the 
access object number. A slot is a slide window of information embedded in a document 
that can be identified in slot_name. When the slot can not be identified by a name, the 
object is not a named slot. Access authorization is assigned to a specific object with its 
identifier. For example, an object access request can be expressed as: 
If concept (ro) = {miscellaneous fee}, then C(ro) = {miscellaneous fee, tuition, billing 
statement}. 
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Definition 4. (Conceptional Expression). A subset of concept expression still belongs to 
a concept expression. When two concept expressions have logical operations in union 
and/or intersection, the result is still concept expressions.   
Definition 5. (Object Entity Identification). http_link-num and http_slot-num are a set 
of link identifiers and slot labels respectively. 
 
6.1.3 Privileges Modes 
Privilege modes will decide incoming user access rights in web-based 
applications. Proposed web access privilege modes include browsing, copying, and 
editing.  Browsing privileges grant requested users the ability to scan or query the 
information in a website. The browsing privilege has view, link, and view-all three types. 
A user uses view access right to read the requested information. Link privilege allows a 
user to understand the particular information on a link. View-all integrates the access 
right from the view and link [1]. 
 Copying allows a user to store the requested materials from websites. Editing 
grants a user to modify the material using delete, insert, update, and compose operations. 
Please see TABLE 8 for detailed information. 
 
6.1.4 Access Authorization 
The goal of authorization is to control service access [33]. Authorization process 
is generally evaluating the access request credential using request identity. Access policy 
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TABLE 8 
Authorization Privilege Model (Revised from Wang and Simmons 2006) [96] 
 
Type Privilege mode Description 
View Understand requested information 
Link Observe the existence of contents 
Browsing 
View-all Get information in the requested links  
Copying Download and 
Store 
Save the information from the requested 
website 
Insert Put more information into website 
Delete Move information out from a website 
Update  Change information objects as desired 
 
 Editing 
Compose Add contents to a website 
 
 
 
 
will decide every user to access the web-based applications. Access policy can be defined 
in subject credentials, object credentials, access privileges, and requested access time [1], 
[7]. The proposed authorization process will emphasize subject credential evaluations in 
user profiles, IP addresses, and geographical location information. The authorization 
process also combines request object and access privilege. The authorization can be 
formally defined as follows: 
 
Definition 6 [Authorization] Authorization can be expressed in a policy specified by 
(ce, ao, pm, t), where ce is a credential expression used to describe authorized subjects, 
ao is an authorized object identifier for requested materials, pm represents a privilege 
mode, and t is a time variable used to define the valid access time.  
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An example for authorization can be expressed as follows: 
au = (Jeff(x)Λ(geoip(x) equals “128.165.12.10, Forest Lane, Texas Instrument, Dallas, 
Texas  77081”, type(y)=(self-support materials), {view}, [10/5/2005, 12/2/2007]). 
The above example means: au defines that an user Jeff is granted to access to the 
technical support materials from the IP address in 128.165.12.10 at Texas Instrument, 
Forest Lane, Dallas, TX 77081 with a view access right starting from October 5, 2005 to 
December 2, 2007. We can develop the authorization expressions into an authorization 
knowledge base. 
 
6.1.5 Rules in Authorization Knowledge Base 
Rules in authorization base can be directly derived from the specific authorization 
expressions [7]. In Atluri and Chun’s approach, derived rule is ordered from the privilege 
mode. In our proposed scheme, the authorization knowledge base is based on rule 
expressions in subject. For example, au = (David(x) Λ (geoip(x) equals “165.128.10.3, 
Welcome Blvd, Houston, TX 77805”, type(y) = (self-support materials), {insert}, 
{10/2/2006, 12/2/2007}). For the ip address in 165.128.10.3 from the above physical 
location, rule au’ = (David(x) Λ (geoip(x) equals “165.128.10.3, Welcome Blvd, 
Houston, TX 77805”, type(y) = (self-support materials), {delete}, {10/2/2006, 
12/2/2007}) is true also since the request IP address has edit access privilege. 
In the knowledge base, we can develop and refine rules from empirical data to do 
access control. Then, we may conduct user profile analysis, knowledge analysis, and 
utility evaluation for the role base. Specifically, usability and performance will be 
evaluated [86]. 
                                                                                                                                                             91
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
6.2 Access Control [96] 
Anderson classified access controls into four different levels. The access control 
can apply to applications, middleware, operating systems, and the hardware level [3]. For 
the web-based applications, the access control is applied to the application level. The 
access control strategy is to map request identities to their access privileges and the 
privileges to the request materials [11], [35]. Hollar and Murphy brought up the system 
performance issues in the web-based applications. The performance is related to the 
number of roles used in the access decisions. There are several access control schemes 
existing. These include role-based access control, attribute-based access control, 
mandatory based access control, etc. The role-based access control is selected in this 
dissertation. Formally, access control can be defined in access request expression. The 
proposed access control algorithms are defined as follows [1], [7]:  
Definition 7 [Access Request Expression]. Access request expression can be 
represented as ARE = (s, ro, pm), here s is the requested subject ID, ro is requested object 
expression, and pm is the privilege mode that the access request has.  
For example, 
ARE1 = (Jefferson, 18(y), delete) 
ARE2 = (Daniel, type(k)=”Nortel technical support materials”, view)  
The first statement is integrated as Jefferson plans to delete an object with 
identifier number 18. If we have access request ARE = (s, ro, m) and an authorization 
base {z1, z2, z3, …zn} where zi is defined as (ce, ao, pm, t), the access control in the web 
server will examine the authorizations for ARE from the authorization base. The 
authorization is taken in several steps. When a remote user submits a request to the web-
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based applications to request some materials, the system will first examine the subject 
credential expression. If the request user passes the examination, the system will look 
into the authorized object to see whether the requested object characteristics are satisfied. 
If the examination meets the credentials, the privilege mode m will be searched. If all the 
criteria meet the rules, the requested objects will be queried and transported.  To outline 
the discussions above, the authorization process adapts four major steps: Subject 
credential match-up, object expression check, privilege examination, and finally 
delivering the requested information. However, all these processes are defined using the 
access control algorithms.  
 
6.2.1 Access Control Algorithms  
In access control algorithms, the most important access control is authorization. 
The authorization algorithms start from searching the user credentials. If all the user 
credentials are found, the users will get into the system. User access is evaluated using 
the access control algorithms in Fig. 7. Please see Fig. 7 for details. In the authorization 
process, the most important examination is searching the authorized users (Fig. 8). User 
credential is composed with user credential expressions and queried from the 
authorization base. In this dissertation, an exact user authorization is represented 
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     Fig.7. Authorization in access control (Revised from Wang and Simmons 2006) 
     [96]. 
 
 
 
 
Access control algorithm 1 
 
Input: Remote user request in RUR = (s, ro, pm), where s is a    
           subject credential expression, ro is request objects, pm is a 
           privilege mode. 
Output: An access request is authorized or declined. 
 
AU = search-authorized-user(s) 
Initialize list re={}; 
 
Begin: 
If AU = {} { 
     return (access_declined); 
} 
else { 
       
      for each aoi = {si, roi, pm} Є AUi  { 
             If pm == (‘view’ or ‘link’ or ‘view-all’) 
                       re = re υ view(aoi ) υ link(aoi ) υ view-all (aoi ); 
              else if (pm == ‘copy’)  
                        re = re υ aoi; 
             else if (pm == ‘insert’ or ‘delete’ or ‘update’ or ‘compose’)  
                     re = re υ insert(aoi) υ delete(aoi) υ update(aoi) υ 
                           compose(aoi); 
       } 
        return (re); 
     } 
 
End 
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      Fig. 8. Request access user evaluation (Revised from Wang and Simmons  
      2006) [96] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access control algorithm 2: Search Authorization Users 
 
Input: Remote user request: RUR= (s, ro, pm), where s is a request 
           subject credential expression, ro is requested objects, and pm 
            is a request privilege mode. Access material set: O; privilege 
            set: m. 
Output: Requested users are granted or declined. 
 
 
Begin: 
 
Initialize stack AU to the empty; 
 
If  requested_user_login and ip_address are found { 
     If zip_code and city_name and country_name match { 
  
          If (ro Є O) and (pm Є m)  
                push RUR to Stack AU; 
     } 
 popup   Stack AU; 
 return (AU) ;       
} 
End 
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   Fig 9. Subject credential expression evaluation (Revised from Atluri and Chun 
   2004 [7]) 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 3: Subject credential evaluation 
 
Procedure Evaluate-subject-credentials (ce, P). 
 
Input: ce is a subject credential expression, P is the existing user 
           credential profiles. 
Output: TRUE or FALSE. 
Initilize a Link-list S 
 
  For each pair (attribute_name, a_value) Є cei   { 
         If (ce(attribute_name) = P(attribute_name)) and 
              ce(a_value) = P (a_value)) 
                flag = 1; 
         else 
                flag =-1; 
  } 
  While ((flag ==1) and (cei != NULL)){ 
           Add cei in string to Link-list S; 
           cei = Link-list[i]; 
           (exp1, operator, exp2) = Split (cei); 
           // operators take one of the operations in {>, <, =, ≠, ≤, ≥, υ, etc} 
           er = (exp1 operator exp2); 
                                   /*evaluate the expression */ 
           return er;  
  } 
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using remote user information, ip address, and geographical location information. The 
user credential checks also include the role operations in delete, insert, update, etc. 
Subject credential expression evaluation algorithm is presented in Fig. 9. The 
evaluation also includes subject credential expression operations. These include insert, 
delete, update, etc. Privilege evaluation algorithm is listed on Fig. 10.  In the credential 
expression evaluation, there are some logical operations that need to translate into 
mathematical expressions. The authorization base system either grants the request 
privilege or declines it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
         Fig. 10. Privilege mode evaluation (Revised from Wang and Simmons 
         2006) [96]. 
 
Access control algorithm 4: Privilege mode evaluation 
 
Input: An user request privilege mode: pm, a set of privilege modes 
in authorization: m. 
Output: TRUE or FALSE 
 
Initialize m={a group of privilege modes} 
 
If  ( pm Є m) 
 
       Return (TRUE); 
 
Else 
       Return (FALSE); 
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       Fig. 11. System architecture (Modified from Netgeo 2002; Wang and Simmons 
       2006) [64], [96]. 
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6.3 System Architecture for Implementation [96] 
The proposed system architecture is described in Fig. 11. Because the proposed 
authorization model mostly relies on the subject credential for access evaluation, the 
system architecture will appraise the conditions from subject credential expressions first. 
Next, the requested object expressions will be examined using the object identifiers. 
Lastly, the privilege model will be checked. If all the evaluations are satisfied, remote 
users will obtain permission to access the requested information. Hollar and Murphy 
(2006) proposed three options for the access control decision point [34]. The three 
options are integrating the access control: (1). Within the web server as a component; (2). 
As a external procedure; (3). As part of database management system access control. In 
the opinion of Hollar and Murphy, taking use of database management system access 
control as the access control decision point is the best practice. Integrating the access 
control with the web service is the least attractive approach. In our proposed approach, 
we intend to integrate the access control in the authorization base with the database 
management system in Fig. 11. 
 
6.4 Major Contributions  
 Atluri and Chun [7] developed an authorization model in geospatial data. The 
requested access is granted according to the image location, resolution, and the 
downloaded time in the data. The authorization relies on the geospatial data. Netgeo 
(2002) developed an architecture using ip addresses and physical locations in credit card 
fraud detection [64]. The approach is a good practice for credit access verifications. The 
method is not flexible for different organizations though. The method belongs to an exact 
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user authorization. Adam, Atluri, and Bertino (2002) specified a content-based 
authorization model used in digital libraries [1]. The model authorizes the requested users 
only using their requested contents.  
In our proposed solution for the web-based applications, we propose to use a role-
based access control using the enhanced subject credential evaluations. Our proposed 
model has a high flexibility in order to specify authorization rules according to the web 
product requirements. The proposed model integrates flexible role-based access control 
with an exact subject credential expression in ip address and geographic location 
information. The model appears to be prominent in all the approaches available. The 
access control and authorization are both regarding computer systems which allocate the 
resources based on the identity and their privileges. Both are associated with the 
authentication process. As the role-based access control has received more attention 
recently, the role-based access control has being combined with other property in the 
designed system. For example, Xu et. al. (2004) developed a service–oriented role-based 
access control [102]. They specified all the services in their roles. Our approach is to 
adapt the user Internet service property in ip address and their geographic information as 
subject credentials to authenticate the users. The information can keep the rules updated 
in the web-based application systems as the remote users use the intended services and 
have some network activities associated with the provided services. Our approach has 
appeared to be an attractive approach in comparison with the existing approaches. 
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6.5 Future Performance Analysis 
Future performance analysis will concentrate on scalability analysis and RBAC 
flow analysis. The scalability analysis will be conducted to simulate the number of access 
users and system performance. The system performance in response time, throughputs, 
and availability will be measured for different number of access users. Using these 
parameters, we can estimate whether the designed system can perform the intended 
functions. If the performance is demanding, we may consider using multiple web servers 
in parallel to improve the system performance in throughputs, response time, and 
availability in the web-based applications. For the detailed measurements, please refer to 
Menasce and Almeida’s book on “Capacity planning for web services: Metrics, models, 
and methods” [57].    
The RBAC flow analysis will use role graphs to simulate role hierarchies and 
analyze the RBAC. In the analysis, we need to pay attention to the separation of duty and 
role conflicts. For instance, role-based access controls need continual human operations 
in being kept updated. The operations include role addition, role deletion, role-privilege 
update, and etc. Access permissions are assigned to different roles. Users are assigned to 
a set of roles. Access decisions are based on users and associated roles [11]. The 
information flow in the RBAC can be expressed as role graphs with directed edges for 
access privileges. The role graphs are used to track information flows among objects in 
the RBAC system. The approach assumes that the content in an object can be duplicated 
to another object. The duplicated operation is realized using read and write privileges. 
For the detailed analysis, please refer to Benantar’s book in “Access control system: 
Security, identity management and trust model”.   
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In the role-base access control, we have challenges in separating duty. Duty 
separation has two possible ways: Static separation (authorization time separation) and 
dynamic separation (runtime separation). The dynamic duty separation has simple 
dynamic, object-based, operational, and history-based separation of duty. Simple 
dynamic separation is that users are not allowed to use two limited roles in multiple 
sessions at a time point. Object-based separation means that no two separated roles can 
be assigned to an object that has been operated. Object-based separation restricts a user to 
a single action on only one object.   
We also need to handle role conflicts. For example, separation of duty is one type 
of handling conflicts. The role conflicts include conflicting permissions, users, and tasks. 
For conflicting permissions, we need to rearrange different permissions as unordered 
pairs. For conflicting users, any set of users is reduced to a single user and each user is 
assigned to non-conflicting roles. For conflicting tasks, a set of tasks for a business 
process require conflicting access permissions to accomplish. Conflicting tasks are 
assigned to different roles. All these routine operations can become expensive and 
difficult when there are extremely large access systems involved. The good news is that 
the research used in role-based trust management language and runtime engine to map 
entities with roles in their properties is in progress. The new system can retrieve digital 
credentials remotely.  
In the dissertation, I present the improved security framework. The proposed 
framework improves application security in the web-based applications using enhanced 
subject credential authorization in computer geographical information. The future work 
may center on converting the proposed framework to a system. The system performance 
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parameters will be measured and analyzed. Taking into consideration the system 
performance parameters, we can make our model become an adaptive system with a 
satisfied performance. I would like to conclude this chapter with an opinion of 
Bindiganavale and Ouyang (2006) [13]. The role-based access control has become an 
excellent approach for access control because of the reduced complexity and cost for 
system administrators. Using RBAC, security system management in user profiles is 
easily operated in roles, hierarchies, and access privileges.        
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CHAPTER VII  
 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 
 
7.1 Research Summary 
In this dissertation, I conducted both a security analysis and a security related risk 
assessment. Preliminary analysis indicates that there are several vulnerabilities existing in 
the open web proxy honeypot. Because these vulnerabilities exist, computer hackers 
attack the vulnerabilities and penetrate into the systems, causing security concerns for the 
web-based applications. The security is measured by immediate system availability and 
mean time to security failure in Markov Process Model. This is the first attempt to apply 
Markov Process Model to multiple component software systems to measure security in 
complex systems. This approach can be applied to other complex systems. Also, because 
software vulnerabilities are present in the web-based applications, security related system 
risk is assessed in fuzzy logic. Vulnerability based risk assessment is a new way to 
measure software system reliability in security.  The root cause of security issues and 
security related risks is software vulnerabilities.  As computing applications become 
pervasive, security issues and their risks have become an important concern for trusted 
computing. To improve software security, several security enhancement approaches have 
been proposed to address security related problems. Specifically, I presented an enhanced 
security improvement model in access control algorithms using GeoIP service as a new 
approach. 
 The first part of the research explored the security analysis for the web-based 
applications. In the beginning chapters, I presented some security analysis of the studied 
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systems as a background, and the following chapters discussed security measurement in 
access availability and mean time to security using Markov Process model. Each 
subsystem in web client, web server, and database server was modeled as good, 
vulnerable, attacked, and security-failure states. The whole system was modeled by the 
Markov Process Model. The subsystem interactions were also modeled by the Markov 
Model in the state transition diagram. The security failure in the system was analyzed by 
an example using the real data. The method for system risk analysis was developed using 
the reported vulnerabilities and fuzzy logic methods. To overcome the subjective 
measurements in fuzzy logic method, information entropy theory was applied as weight 
coefficient to adjust the measurement. The outlined methods have potential to become a 
standardized method for the security analysis in the web-based application systems.   
The second part of the dissertation presents the specification and implementation 
architecture for the web-based application security systems. The proposed methods are 
easy to adapt to different web-based applications according to the organization 
requirements (technical support materials in commercial companies, digital storage 
deposit, patient information systems, etc). The existing authorization models do not 
emphasize subject credential evaluation enough, which is the most important in access 
control. In this dissertation, the subject credential in remote user logins, user IP 
addresses, zip codes, cities, states, and countries are integrated with the access privilege 
and requested objects to authorize access requests.  The proposed approach incorporates 
the merits of existing methods in this research area. Simply put, the first part of the 
dissertation analyzes security issues and its related risk, and the second part proposes a 
solution to improve security in the web-based applications. 
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7.2 Future Research 
 Future work for the security analysis in the web-based applications will focus on 
the model performance evaluation. More case studies, however, are needed to validate 
the proposed approach; future work will likely center on sensitivity analysis for the 
outlined methods. As any risk study in other systems, these studies in the web-based 
applications have dependent and independent variables that are connected by a system 
equation that combines technical, financial, and other factors. Each factor is evaluated by 
the risk model with the expected output that indicates whether the security risk factor is 
suitable or not. The key risk input variable will be decided by the evaluation.     
 Many trials have been conducted to develop algorithms to indicate which 
variables have more contribution to risk index. The risk index for all the variables will be 
different with each round of inputs. To overcome this, hold-all-but-one-constant 
(HABOC) method has been developed. For the detailed information and case study 
procedures, please refer to Koller’s book “Risk assessment and decision making in 
business and industry: A practical guide” (1999) [48]. The security analysis data used in 
this dissertation was collected by an open web proxy honeypot. In an operating web-
based application system, the data may have some variance from the data collected by the 
open proxy honeypot. Nevertheless, open web proxy honeypots are still the most popular 
method for data collection in security analysis.     
For the enhanced security model in the web-based applications, I plan to extend 
the framework here to implement a secure web-based application. As the web-based 
applications become a major platform of computing, security requirements for web 
application are also higher. The negative aspect of the proposed approach may result in 
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some privacy concerns, because request user locations are revealed in the subject 
credential expressions for authorization purposes. Performance evaluation will be 
conducted as the scalability analysis needs to be measured. Although the security 
algorithms developed in this dissertation are good, the system in the proposed approach 
may have some performance limitations in throughput and processing time when having 
an extremely large number of access requests. By incorporating the performance 
parameter considerations, the proposed system will have good performance as expected.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
GLOSSARY† 
ActiveX is a set of programming technologies and tools. ActiveX is a dynamic link of 
library modular. When you enable a program to run in active X environment, you create a 
component. The component is called Active X control. ActiveX is Microsoft’s response 
to emerging java technology, and an Active X control is similar to a java applet [92].  
AJAX: Asynchronous JavaScript and XML is a tool to develop interactive applications 
for the web and execute user requests right away. Ajax integrates several programming 
tools in JavaScript, dynamic HTML, Extensible Markup Language (XML), cascading 
style sheets (CSS), and the Document Object Model (DOM), etc. Ajax displays web page 
content change immediately when a user makes an action. This is very different from the 
http requests that are uploading the whole page [92].    
ASP stands for active server page. ASP is an HTML page that runs one or more scripts. 
The scripts are executed on web server before the html page is delivered to the user. An 
ASP is similar to a server side include or a common gateway interface. The scripts are 
running on the server and making a page ready for user. Usually, the script on the server 
takes input from user request to access data sources, then composes the page before 
sending it to the requester [92].  
                                               
†
 The references cited in this appendix are listed in the reference section. 
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ATN (Automated Trust Negotiation) is an approach that manages the sensitive 
information communication using access control policies. ATN provides a practical 
credential language, acknowledge policies, and distributed credential repository [85]. 
Awstats is a popular log graph software from open source development. It can make 
statistical graphs from log files. The log files may be from web, ftp or mail server.  
CERT: is an abbreviation for the Computer Emergency Readiness Team. It was founded 
by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) in November 1988 after 
the Internet was attacked by an Internet worm. Today, CERT handles major Internet 
incidents and provides avoidance advice for security breaches.  CERT is located at 
Carnegie-Mellon University, funded by the US federal government [92]. 
CGI: is an abbreviation for Common Gateway Interface. CGI is a program running on 
web server that executes a web user request and sends data to the user. When a user fills 
out a form on a web page, it needs to be processed by an application script. The method 
for passing data between web servers and applications is called common gateway 
interface [92].   
Code Red: was a computer worm that attacked the Internet on July 13, 2001. The Code 
Red specifically attacked computers running Microsoft IIS web server. The worm can 
spread and cause victim machine buffer overflow. In the buffer overflow, the worm uses 
a long string to infect the computer. Code Red system footprint is default.ida; Code Red 
network footprint uses port 80 to infect the machine [92]. 
Denial of Service Attack: is an attack that makes computer resources unavailable to their 
intended users.  Typically, attackers make many requests to flood web servers or network 
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servers so that the servers cannot provide normal services to their users. Denial of service 
is one of the popular attacks on the Internet [92].    
DCOM: is an abbreviation for Distributed Component Object Model. DCOM is a set of 
program interfaces that client program objects can request services from server program 
objects remotely in a network. DCOM relies on the component object model that 
supports some interfaces to allow clients and servers communicating within the same 
computer. DCOM also can adapt TCP/IP and http to provide distributed services [92]. 
FTP: is an abbreviation for File Transfer Protocol. FTP is an easy method for exchanging 
files between different computers on the network. FTP is an application protocol that uses 
TCP/IP protocols. FTP is very often used to download files from remote sites to a local 
computer [92].  
Fuzzy logic:  is derived from fuzzy set theory for reasoning in applications. Fuzzy set 
theory was invented by Lotfi Zadeh at University of California in 1965. Fuzzy set is a 
translation function. A fuzzy set is a mapping from the domain into the interval [0, 1]. 
This mapping is called the membership or characteristic function of a given fuzzy set. 
Fuzzy sets can be used to construct linguistic term sets. Term sets represent meaningful 
abstractions of a variable’s value. Fuzzy logic is the mechanism for reasoning with fuzzy 
rules, which is a factual statement about the application. Rules are expressed in terms of 
fuzzy relations in Cartesian product of the domain of antecedent and consequent 
variables. The process of inference is produced in composition of given fact with a given 
rule. The net effect is a possibility distribution about the domain of definition of the 
consequent variable [106]. 
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GeoIP: is a database which can map a computer Internet IP address by its physical 
location information. 
HTTP: Hypertext transfer protocol is a group of rules for transferring files on the web. 
The files may be in text, graphic images, sound, video, and other multimedia formats. 
HTTP is an application protocol using TCP/IP protocols. HTTP can be used to request 
and deliver information for end application users. A web server with an HTTP daemon is 
to wait for HTTP requests and deliver the contents when the requests arrive. Your web 
browser can act as an HTTP client, sending requests to web servers. When a browser user 
submits a uniform resource locator (URL) or opens a hypertext link, the web browser 
builds up a HTTP request and delivers the contents to the Internet Protocol address 
specified by the URL [92]. 
Information Entropy: is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. 
In the communication area, the higher the entropy is, the more errors [94]. 
Markov Chain: A stochastic process is a Markov chain if 1) time is discrete, 2). The set 
of possible values of the process at each time is finite or countably infinite, and 3). It has 
memoryless property. That is, future state depends on the present state, independent of 
past states [92]. 
Markov process: A Markov process is a stochastic process where all the values are 
calculated from a discrete set. In a first order Markov process, the most recent state 
determines the result of next one. All the processes can be represented by a Markov 
transition density matrix [92].  
MAC: is an abbreviation for Media Access Control. MAC is a unique hardware address 
that identifies each node in a computer network. In the open systems interconnection 
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model (OSI), the media access control is one of two sub-layers of data link control. The 
other sub-layer is logic link control layer [92]. 
MS SQL Server: MS SQL server is a relational database management system developed 
by Microsoft. MS SQL server uses Transact SQL (T-SQL), which is programming 
extensions to Sybase. Microsoft has added some new features to standard SQL, including 
transaction control, exception and error handling, row processing and variable 
declarations, etc [92]. 
MySQL: is a relational database management systems using Structure Query language 
(SQL). MySQL is open source software systems. MySQL can support Linux, Unix, and 
windows platform. MySQL supports application program interfaces (APIs) for several 
programming languages. Some language examples include C, C++, python, Perl, PHP, 
TCL, etc [92].  
Nimda: is a computer virus that can cause traffic slowdown across the Internet. The 
Nimda worm spreads in four different ways and specifically infects computers with 
Microsoft Internet Information server. First, Nimda probes each IP address within a 
random selected range in computers running Microsoft II server. Second, when visitors 
access the computer infected with Nimda, the Nimda can be sent to other computers in 
the Internet in random way. Third, Nimda also infects users within the web server’s own 
local network. Finally, an infected system with Nimda can send an email with the 
attachment “readme.exe” to the computers in local window address book. To fix the 
Nimda problem, a patch should be applied to infected machine. Also, users should never 
open an attached “redame.exe” email [92]. 
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QoS: is an abbreviation for Quality of service. QoS is the concept about transmission 
rates, error rates, and guaranteed service quality in advance. For example, QoS is a major 
concern for continuous transmission of video and multimedia information in computer 
networks [92].  
RSS: is a XML-based approach for delivering web content in feeds. Feeds let the user 
have new content delivered to a computer once when it is published. RSS readers provide 
the user with summaries of all the feeds in one place. RSS is an abbreviation that refers to 
one of three different formats, which include RDF Site Summary, Rich Site Summary, 
and Really Simple Syndication. RSS formats are defined in XML [92]. 
SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol is a method for a program running in one 
operating systems (i.e. Windows) to communicate with a program in the same or 
different operating systems (i.e. Unix) using HTTP and XML for information exchange. 
SOAP defines how to code the http header and XML file so that the programs in different 
operating systems can communicate with each other [92].  
SQL Injection: is a kind of software vulnerability in which attackers can use Structured 
Query Language string operations to gain access to computer and data resources or 
operate on the data. SQL injection happens when SQL server accepts user input in the 
SQL statement and the SQL server does not remove dangerous characters from the input 
[92].  
SSI: is an abbreviation for Server Side Include. SSI is a variable value. A server can 
include SSI in the HTML files before it send to the requestor. For example, last modified 
date can be inserted in the HTML file as an embedded variable in html. The server can 
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obtain the last modified date for the file and insert into HTML file before HTML is sent 
to web requestor [92].  
SSL: is an abbreviation for Secure Socket Layer. SSL is a secure protocol for delivering 
information over the Internet.  SSL has been replaced by Transport Layer Security (TSL) 
which relies on SSL. SSL adapts private and public key encryption scheme from RSA for 
data communication. SSL is implemented by a program located between HTTP and TCP 
layers [92]. 
TCP/IP: Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol is the basic communication 
protocol for the computer network. When your computer accesses the Internet, your 
computer is running with a copy of TCP/IP program as is every other computer that you 
are communicating with (send message or get information). TCP/IP is a two layer 
program. Transmission Control Protocol on the top layer breaks a message into smaller 
packets that are transmitted over the Internet. TCP is also responsible for receiving 
packets and assembling the packets into the original message. The lower layer of Internet 
Protocol is responsible for delivering each packet to the right destination. TCP/IP uses the 
client/server model. TCP/IP communication is primarily used for a connection restored to 
two endpoints. TCP/IP and its applications are “stateless”.  Each client request is treated 
as a new request, independent of any previous one [92].    
TTL: Time-to-live is a value in an Internet Protocol (IP) packet that tells a network 
router whether the packet in the network is too long and should be discarded. For various 
reasons, packets may not get delivered to their destination in a reasonable length of time 
[92]. 
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XML: is designed to transport and store data. Extensible Markup Language (XML) is 
intended to provide a common information format and share both format and the data on 
the World Wide Web and elsewhere. XML allows users to specify their own elements. 
XML can be used by any individual or group to share information in a consistent way 
[92].  
XSS: cross site scripting. This is most severe type of web software vulnerability. There 
are two types of cross site scripting vulnerability: reflected XSS and stored XSS. The 
stored XSS is about one user input information that is viewed by another user who later 
visits the same sites. Typically, there are some web forms. One user enters information 
there, and information is viewed later by other users in input forms. The reflected XSS is 
about embedding the script into URL. The attacker can email a link to a user. When the 
user opens the link, the web content is changed by URL [92].  
World Wide Web: is a computer system with interlinked hypertext documents. World 
Wide Web may contain text, video, image materials. It is accessed by computer network 
[92] 
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APPENDIX  B 
 
LETTERS OF PERMISSION FROM THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS 
1. Copyright Permission Letter for Part of Contents in Chapter V. 
Date: Tue, 27 May 2008 10:45:40 -0400 
From: Mary Ann Sullivan <isca@ipass.net> 
To: Yong Wang <y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu> 
Subject: Re: Copyright Permission for  AP_2605 
Parts/Attachments: 
   1   OK    ~52 lines  Text (charset: ISO-8859-1) 
   2 Shown   ~47 lines  Text (charset: ISO-8859-1) 
---------------------------------------- 
Dear Yong Wang: 
I hereby grant you permission to use the work as stated below.  You should include the 
copyright from ISCA such as 
... 
Printed with permission ©ISCA 2008 
Regards, 
Mary Ann Sullivan 
Executive Director, ISCA 
 
 
At 02:27 PM 5/22/2008, you wrote: 
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Mary Ann Sullivan 
Executive Director, ISCA 
International Society for Computers 
   and Their Applications 
975 Walnut Street, Suite 132 
Cary, NC   27511  USA 
Phone:  919-467-5559 
FAX:    919-467-3430 
 
Dear Ms. Mary Ann Sullivan: 
          I am a doctoral student at Texas A&M University and am writing for permission to 
include Chapter V from "Software security analysis and assessment for web-based 
applications" in the proceeding of the 17th ISCA Software Engineering and Data 
Engineering, Los Angeles, June 30-July 2, 2008 in part of my dissertation. The 
dissertation will be made available to the public on the web through Texas A&M 
University Libraries. In addition, the dissertation will be microfilmed by ProQuest 
Information and Learning Company, and copies of the dissertation will be sold on 
demand. Please supply a statement granting me permission to use the work. You can 
email the permission to y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu. 
          Please advise me with related information if I need to contact the publisher 
directly. 
          Thank you for your help. 
               Sincerely, 
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              Yong Wang 
 
 
Mary Ann Sullivan 
Executive Director, ISCA 
International Society for Computers 
   and Their Applications 
975 Walnut Street, Suite 132 
Cary, NC   27511  USA 
Phone:  919-467-5559 
FAX:    919-467-3430 
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2. Letter from Copyright Permission Holder for Chapter VI 
 
Date: Thu, 29 May 2008 09:41:10 -0600 
From: Calgary <Calgary@iasted.org> 
To: 'Yong Wang' <y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu> 
Subject: RE: Copyright request 
 
Dear Contributor, 
You have our permission to reuse your paper as a part of your dissertation. 
Please remember that FULL credit must be provided to IASTED for permission to 
reprint. 
 
Nicholas Woodard 
Publications Coordinator 
IASTED and ACTA Press 
B6, 101 - 2509 Dieppe Avenue SW 
Calgary AB  T3E 7J9 
CANADA 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Yong Wang [mailto:y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu] 
Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2008 10:54 AM 
To: Calgary 
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Cc: y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu 
Subject: Copyright request 
IASTED Secretariat 
Building B6, Suite #101 
2509 Dieppe Avenue SW 
Calgary, Alberta 
Canada T3E 7J9 
May 22, 2008 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
      I am a doctoral student at Texas A&M University and am writing for permission to 
include Chapter VI from "Enhanced enterprise web-based application security using 
GEOIP service" in the Proceeding of the 10th IASTED Conference on Software 
Engineering and Application, Dallas, 2006 in my dissertation. The dissertation will be 
made available to the public on the web through Texas A&M University Libraries. In 
addition, the dissertation will be microfilmed by ProQuest Information and Learning 
Company, and copies of the dissertation will be sold on demand. Please supply a 
statement granting me permission to use the work. You can email the permission to 
y0w4000@cs.tamu.edu. If I need to contact Acta Press publishing directly, please 
provide their contact information. 
      Thank for your help. 
       Sincerely, 
       Yong Wang 
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